by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is --
'(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work.'
The facts summarized above plainly warrant the belief that respondent has engaged in, and has induced and encouraged individuals employed by Northern, and other persons engaged in commerce or in industries affecting commerce, to engage in, strikes or refusals in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or other wise handle or work on goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform services, and have threatened, coerced and restrained Northern, and other persons engaged in commerce or in industries affecting commerce. The belief is also plainly warranted that respondent engaged in this conduct with an object of forcing or requiring Northern, to assign the work of moving the aforesaid vehicles to and from the said of the ship as above set forth to employees who are members of, or represented by, respondent, rather than to employees who are members of Local 14, or who are not members of, or represented by, respondent.
Section 8(b)(4)(i)(ii)(D) prohibits all strike conduct, or inducement of such, whether primary or secondary, for the objective proscribed by the section. It is designed to protect commerce from disruption over jurisdictional claims of a labor organization to work which has already been assigned to members of another labor organization, or another trade, craft or class. The only exemption specified in the Act is when an employer is failing to adhere to a Board order or certification covering the work in dispute. Respondent has shown no such Board order or certification.
Respondent contends that it is entitled to the work demanded because of a contractual assignment. Whether or not this be so, it is an issue which must be resolved by the Board in the proceeding before it and not by this Court. See Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 2 Cir., 242 F.2d 808, 810; Douds v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, 2 Cir., 248 F.2d 534, 537-538; Vincent v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, D.C.W.D.N.Y., 186 F.Supp. 583, 41 LRRM 2403, 2404; Dooley v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers, etc., D.C., 182 F.Supp. 297.
On the record before us, reasonable cause plainly exists to believe that respondent has violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(ii)(D) of the Act.
Application for injunctive relief under Section 10(l) of the Act has frequently been made to this Court.
In brief, the Act empowers the Board, upon the filing of appropriate charges, to issue, hear and determine complaints that employers or labor organizations have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act. (Section 10(a), (b) and (c) of the Act). Congress was aware, however, that proceedings of this character -- which ultimately are reviewable by the Court of Appeals (Section 10(e) and (f) of the Act) -- are protracted and time consuming, and that certain unfair labor practices being committed by labor organizations gave, or tended to give, rise to such serious and unjustifiable interruptions to commerce that their continuance, pending disposition by the Board, would result in irreparable injury to the purposes of the Act.
Accordingly, in order to prevent a frustration of the statutory purpose, Congress provided in Section 10(l) of the Act,
in pertinent part, that --
'Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(A), (B), or (C) of section 8(b), or section 8(e), or section 8(b)(7), the preliminary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases except cases of like character in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any district court of the United States (including the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia) within any district where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such petition the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other provision of law: * * * Upon filing of any such petition the courts shall cause notice thereof to be served upon any person involved in the charge and such person, including the charging party, shall be given an opportunity to appear by counsel and present any relevant testimony: Provided further, That for the purposes of this subsection district courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in promoting or protecting the interests of employee members * * *. In situations where such relief is appropriate the procedure specified herein shall apply to charges with respect to section 8(b)(4)(D).'
Section 10(l) of the Act embodies the determination of Congress that even the threatened disruption of commerce by acts and conduct proscribed by Section 8(b)(4)(i)(ii)(D) is unjustified and inimical to the national interest. In that section, therefore, Congress imposed a mandatory duty upon the Board's officer or regional attorney to whom the matter it referred to seek injunctive relief in the appropriate district court upon a reasonable belief that a violation has occurred and empowered the court petitioned to grant the injunctive relief deemed 'just and proper.' The legislative history of the Act shows that Congress intended such power to be exercised by the court in aid of the 'prompt elimination of the obstructions to the free flow of commerce' which the relatively slow procedures before the Board had failed to achieve.
Under such circumstances, the propriety of injunctive relief in Section 10(l) cases turns not upon traditional equity criteria applicable in suits between private parties, but upon the necessity of effectuating the statutory policy. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331, 64 S. Ct. 587, 88 L. Ed. 754. It is well settled that where Congress sets the standards for the issuance of injunctions, those standards, and no others, need be satisfied to sustain the prayer for injunctive relief.
Respondent's deliberate conduct, designed to defeat the objectives of the Act and to disrupt the operations of Northern and other persons, clearly is the kind of activity intended by Congress to be enjoined by the Court under the 'just and proper' criteria established by the Act for the Court's exercise of its functions. Likewise, the scope of the relief sought herein falls well within those standards. The requested order is directed only against the labor organization charged with having committed the unfair labor practice, and against agents and persons acting in concert with it; it enjoins only the acts which respondent has been charged with committing in violation of Section 8(b) (4)(i)(ii)(D) of the Act, and similar acts in violation of that section. The relief sought, being limited to a prevention of the specific evil which Congress desired to eradicate, is clearly warranted by the Act.
Actually the relief requested of the Court in this proceeding is commensurate with the danger found by Congress to exist in the continuance of the kind of conduct engaged in by respondent and is necessary to assure its discontinuance. Moreover, 'Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved.' Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation, No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552, 57 S. Ct. 592, 601, 81 L. Ed. 789. 'For the standards of the public interest not the requirements of private litigation measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief in these cases.' Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331, 64 S. Ct. 587, 592, 88 L. Ed. 754; F.T.C. v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 7 Cir., 191 F.2d 744, 747. Congress has found that the discontinuance of conduct like respondent's pending the disposition by the Board of the unfair labor practice charge is necessary 'adequately to protect the public welfare which is inextricably involved in labor disputes.' S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 8. 'When Congress itself has struck the balance, (between conflicting public interests) a court of equity is not justified in ignoring that pronouncement under the guise of exercising equitable discretion.' Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 609-610, 72 S. Ct. 863, 897, 96 L. Ed. 1153. 'And the proper working of the scheme fashioned by Congress to determine industrial controversies fairly and peaceably demands that the courts quite as much as the administrative body act as Congress has required.' N.L.R.B. v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318, 343, 60 S. Ct. 918, 931, 84 L. Ed. 1226.
What we have said here has been said so much better by District Judge Steel, of the District of Delaware, in Dooley v. Highway Truckdrivers, etc., 182 F.Supp. 297, 303 supra, decided on February 26, 1960, that we call special attention to that case. It involved somewhat similar facts.
There Local 107 of the Highway Truckdrivers threw picket lines around the Wilmington, Delaware, plant of Safeway Stores, Inc. The latter filed a charge with the Board under Section 10(k) of the Act and alleged that Local 107, in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(D) was engaging in a strike to compel Safeway to assign work to members of Local 107 rather than to the members of two other labor organizations. The charge was referred to Dooley, the Acting Regional Director of the Fourth Region of the Board. He filed a petition in the District Court of Delaware seeking an injunction on behalf of the Board under Section 10(l) of the Act to enjoin Local 107 from engaging in alleged unfair labor practices in violation of the same asserted provisions of the Act alleged here, pending a final adjudication by the Board. Judge Steel granted the prayer of the petition and issued the injunction on a finding that, 'It is just, proper and appropriate that, pending the final adjudication of the controversy by the Board, Local 107, its officers, representatives, agents, servants, employees, attorneys and all members and persons acting in concert or in participation with it or them be enjoined and restrained from the commission, continuation or repetition of the acts and conduct set forth * * *.'
Respondent sets forth as a defense and also in its motion to dismiss that injunctive relief can be granted only if there is reasonable cause to believe that the Board will make an affirmative assignment of the work in dispute, citing the Third Circuit case of N.L.R.B. v. United Association etc. of Pipefitters, 242 F.2d 722, in which Judge Hastie wrote the opinion for the Court. Our answer to this argument is that we are not here concerned, as was the Third Circuit, with enforcement of a Board order following completion of procedures under §§ 10(k), (b), and (c). Rather we are concerned with preliminary relief under § 10(l) as an aid to effective Board action under § 10(k). It is not necessary for us, in the present posture of the case, to consider whether or not the Board will comply with the provisions of 10 as interpreted by this Circuit. An injunction issued by this Court will expire upon the rendering of a determination by the Board under § 10(k). Enforcement of compliance by the respondent with the Board's determination will then be a matter for the Board under § 10(c) and for the Board and the Third Circuit under § 10(e).
Respondent's counsel contends here, as did counsel for Local 107 in Dooley, that no jurisdictional dispute is involved because neither union (Local 14 or Local 1291) has filed a charge or complaint against the other under Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Act. We know no better way of answering than in the words of Judge Steel in the Dooley case (182 F.Supp. at page 306):
'Finally, Local 107 urges that Sec. 8(b)(4)(D) was directed against jurisdictional disputes and that no jurisdictional dispute is here involved because no disagreement exists between the unions. The only controversy, it is said, is between Local 107 and Safeway, and relates to the right of Safeway to discharge its employees who are members of Local 107, to unilaterally terminate the collective bargaining relationship between Safeway and Local 107, and to change its work methods. It is unnecessary to decide with finality just what a jurisdictional dispute is, or to determine with finality whether Sec. 8(b)(4) (D) was intended to reach disputes in addition to those which are jurisdictional, however the latter may be defined. The responsibility of the Court in this proceeding is to decide only whether petitioner had reasonable cause to believe that Sec. 8(b)(4)(D) was being violated.' (Emphasis supplied.)
In conclusion, it is our opinion that petitioner has made out a case that there is reasonable cause to believe that respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, acts and conduct in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(ii), subparagraph (D) of said Act, affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 2(6) and (7) of said Act, and that such acts and conduct will likely be repeated or continued unless enjoined.
For the reasons given, respondent's motion to dismiss will be and hereby is denied, and an order will be entered granting a temporary injunction, as prayed for by petitioner.