from divulging such information. The former question turns solely upon evidentiary rules which are not directly concerned with the source of the offered information, but rather with its relevancy, materiality, competency, etc. The latter question, in contrast, turns solely upon the source of the information, its nature, the circumstances under which it was acquired, etc.
Here the answer to these two questions may very well differ. Assuming a State Court were to rule that Stevens is precluded from divulging business secrets such as customer lists acquired from his former employer, this would not be a ruling upon the admissibility of such customer lists in any federal proceeding. Perhaps this fact would be more clear in a situation where the State Court ruling preceded the institution of the federal proceeding. In such a situation the customer lists might be inaccessible to a party moving for their discovery in the later federal proceeding for the reason that a Federal Court might refuse to lend its process to their discovery. However, this is clearly distinguishable from a ruling by that same Federal Court that they are inadmissible by virtue of Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
We might point out that in resolving the question of whether or not a cause of action is based upon federal law rather than state law, so as to constitute a basis for federal jurisdiction under 1331 of Title 28 U.S.C.A., it is not the prayer for relief which is determinative. Here the plaintiff chose, perhaps unwisely, to pray for an injunction specifically directed at litigation in progress in a federal court. However, the right upon which he relies to pray for such relief is not a right created by the Constitution or Laws of the United States. Certainly a covenant for valuable consideration to refrain from competing with one's former employer is valid and enforceable without reference to federal law. Basic Foods Sales Corp. v. Moyer, D.C.W.D.Pa.1944, 55 F.Supp. 449. For this reason the defendant's argument must fail. Gully v. First National Bank, supra. The further question of whether to remove all or only part of the action need not be answered, since we find no separate and independent claim which would be cognizable originally in a federal court.
The defendant's earnest contention that this case presents a grave question concerning the power of a state court to issue an injunction which would directly effect federal court proceedings appears to rest, at least tacitly, upon the presumption that the state court will issue an injunction specifically directed at discovery proceedings in our Court and thereby impinge upon our processes. We do not share this presumption. In a system of dual sovereign governments such as our own, there are bound to be situations in which problems will arise concerning possible conflicts between the orderly operation of the federal and state governments -- whether it be between the executive, legislative or judicial branches of these governments. These problems can be worked out in the light of our Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States. However, the officials of each of these sovereigns can make these problems easier by each evidencing a respect for and confidence in the operations of the other. There is no reason to believe that a state court will issue a broad injunction which will create unnecessary conflict between that court and our own. Judge Waters, who will ultimately grant or deny relief in this case, is a very able and competent Judge, and we are confident that, should the plaintiff prevail, any order there entered will not unduly impinge upon any proceedings in this Court. The mere fact that the relief in that case may incidentally affect discovery proceedings in the federal antitrust suit offers no basis for removal. As Mr. Justice Cardozo aptly observed in the Gully case, supra (299 U.S. 109, 57 S. Ct. 99), 'The most one can say is that a question of federal law is lurking in the background, just as farther in the background there lurks a question of constitutional law, the question of state power in our federal form of government. A dispute so doubtful and conjectural, so far removed from plain necessity, is unavailing to extinguish the jurisdiction of the states.'
And now, to wit, this 1st day of July, 1960, for the reasons set forth above, it is
Ordered, adjudged and decreed that plaintiff's motion to remand be and it is hereby granted, and the action is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas No. 3 of Philadelphia County.