characterized the defense as vigorous and capable, and indeed our reading of the record confirms this observation. An indication of counsel's vigor is the fact that 48 jurors were called on voir dire before a jury was empanelled, and 150 pages of testimony were taken in that connection. The trial lasted four days, about 250 pages of testimony were recorded of which some two-thirds consisted of direct and cross-examination by the defense counsel. Appellant himself testified at length, witnesses were called by him to establish an alibi, and he called witnesses to refute the Commonwealth's case. There is no merit to his contention pressed here over five years after trial that he was denied the opportunity or the means to call witnesses at his trial.'
Relator's next contention refers to 'new evidence'. His petition has attached to it a statement by one Dorothy Mitchell of a conversation she had with Genevieve Heistand prior to relator's trial, while both women were confined in the York County Prison. Dorothy Mitchell (now Feeser) appeared and testified before us. She testified that Genevieve expressed a personal feeling for relator, and said she was going to implicate him in the murder with Albright and herself. According to this witness, Genevieve also declared, 'If I can't have him (Corbin) nobody else will have him, and I will implicate him in it if I have to lie to do it.' It is asserted that, while this conversation took place before relator's trial, no knowledge thereof was acquired until long afterwards.
It is too clear for discussion that relator's remedy on this score is not by way of habeas corpus, which is directed to such basic and fundamental unfairness or irregularity in the trial as amounts to a denial of due process. By the provisions of the Act of April 22, 1903, P.L. 245, 19 P.S. § 861 et seq., the Commonwealth affords the relator an appropriate remedy.
Relator's final complaint is that he was subjected to 'cruel and unusual punishment,' in that he was interrogated over a period of four months at all hours of the day and night, and in many cases in repeated sessions during the same day; that he was shuttled from one State Police barracks to another for extended periods, and during said periods was denied the right to contract counsel, or parents or friends.
A complete answer to this contention is found in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, supra, which said (391 Pa. 265, 270, 137 A.2d 467, 470):
'As to his own detention, petitioner does not relate in what particular it was improper or irregular, but only insists that he was innocent of the crime of which he was convicted. The trial notes of testimony reveal that petitioner was picked up by the York city police and by the State Police, and questioned on several occasions for varying periods of time, on the murder charge and a bad check charge, but no irregularity appears. If any improper incarceration prior to trial had occurred, it should, of course, have been the subject of a habeas corpus petition at that time. This is not a case where under duress or illegal incarceration a forced confession was elicited from the petitioner. On the contrary, he steadfastly asserted his innocence, and no confession or admission was introduced against him.
The indictment, trial and sentence of petitioner afford a proper basis for appellant's current imprisonment, and no ground for granting his habeas corpus petition appears.
Accordingly we enter the following
Now, June 2nd, 1960, the order to show cause is now vacated and relator's petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.