even though its provisions were no longer on the statute book. This is an argument which must be said very fast to make it sound good. We have no basis for saying that the omission in the 1957 revision was inadvertent. Even if it was, what the legislature said is what makes the rule and not what it might have said had its attention been directed to the omitted paragraph. Judge Kirkpatrick put the point concisely in the unreported case of Shoultz v. Revolvator Co. D.C., 186 F.Supp. 62, an opinion filed February 5, 159: 'When the legislature dropped the statutory definition from the 1957 Act, the only intent which can logically be imputed to it was to return to the long established definition.' See also Lolli v. Mack Truck, Inc., D.C.E.D.Pa., 1958, 170 F.Supp. 671.
It is perfectly clear from the undisputed facts of this case that what the defendant corporation did in Pennsylvania came far short of the requirements of the 'solicitation plus' rule. Its principal place of business is in New York City. It has no resident employee in Pennsylvania. It does business from the New York office by telephone, letter or sending a representative to the customer. It has made no sales contracts in Pennsylvania, owns no land and leases no office space in Pennsylvania. It has no records, bank accounts, funds or telephone listings here. In other words, all the elements of 'doing business' under the 'solicitation plus' rule are lacking.
There is one more string to the plaintiff's bow. On November 10, 1959, the Pennsylvania rule was again changed in effect restoring the 1951 provision which had been stricken out in 1957.
It is to be noted that this legislation comes after the accident (July 1, 1957) and the filing of the complaint in this case (June 26, 1959), after service of process (July 1, 1959), and even after the motion to dismiss had been made (August 5, 1959) but not argued (April 11, 1960).
It is true that perhaps this shows a change of legislative policy in Pennsylvania. But the plaintiff's rights are settled as of the time of his accident and his rights in procedural matters such as jurisdiction over the defendant are settled by the law in force at the time his action was begun. Florio v. Powder-Power Tool Co., 3 Cir., 1957, 248 F.2d 367. Furthermore, two provisions of the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act state very clearly the rule applicable here:
'No law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the Legislature.' Pa.Stat.Ann., tit. 46, § 556.
'Whenever a section or part of a law is amended * * * the new provisions shall be construed as effective only from the date when the amendment became effective.' Pa.Stat.Ann., tit. 46, § 573.
The Florio case is in point. And see also Swavely v. Vandegrift, 1958, 19 Pa.Dist. & Co. R.2d 153, 163, affirmed per curiam 1959, 397 Pa. 281, 154 A.2d 779, 785 and Hughes v. Gilberton Coal Co., 1958, 18 Pa.Dist. & Co. R.2d 329, 331-332.
The clear conclusion from all this is that the action must be dismissed. Therefore, it becomes unnecessary to consider questions of quashing service or additional service. The point is that the defendant was not at the time the action began subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Pennsylvania.