of negotiations and authorizing a strike (Exhibits P-6 and P-6A). On the next day, plaintiff applied to the National Mediation Board for mediation and the case was docketed by that, Board as A6171 (see P-7 and P-7A). A mediator was assigned and mediation meetings were held in April 1960 (N.T. 88). At the hearing on this Motion, defendants admitted that they were waiting for the Mediation Board to make a decision (N.T. 412). At N.T. 436, Mr. Attreed testified that defendants were awaiting a decision by the Board on their 'request for release' from mediation of that dispute. Neither party contends that this dispute justifies work stoppages or picketing at this time. Requests for Findings 18 and 19 of plaintiff on this point are affirmed.
C. Steubenville Dispute.
Plaintiff published Advertisement No. 12 at Mingo Junction, Ohio, about May 3, 1960 (see Exhibits P-18 and D-4). T.W.U.'s Local 2008 objected to positions 21 and 22 as re-advertised in such advertisement on the ground that they did not state the 'duty' of the job, as required by paragraph 2-A-1-b of the collective bargaining agreement (see P-1D, page 1). Defendants contend that the statement 'car repairmen' is not a sufficient designation and that the primary duty, such as 'oiler,' 'bucketer,' or 'heater' should be stated on the advertisement. In accordance with the terms of the negotiation machinery set up in the collective bargaining contract, negotiations were held at the level of the 'Foreman' and 'Superintendent of Personnel.' See Section 7-B-1 and 7-B-2 at page 12 of Exhibit P-1A. A conference was held on May 13, 1960, with a representative of the Superintendent of Personnel at which the Union's protest was overruled and the positions assigned under the advertisement were posted late that day, to be effective at the close of tour of duty May 16, 1960. Plaintiff refused to further delay the new job description, which does not affect seniority or pay of the workers, even though the Union requested maintenance of the status quo until further negotiations had been conducted. Under the terms of the contract (Exhibit P-1A), the Union has until June 12, 1960 (30 days from May 13, 1960) to request that a Joint Submission be prepared in accordance with the terms of Section 7-B-3 of the Agreement (pages 12 & 13 of P-1A). This matter is clearly still in negotiation, as provided for in the collective bargaining agreements, until such 30 days has expired.
As the result of this dispute, Local 2008 sent plaintiff a telegram, certifying that all the members of its local were to act in the capacity of Shop Stewards to represent members of the local (P-19) and called a round-the-clock meeting of all such Shop Stewards to begin at 7 a.m. on May 16. Plaintiff suggested the arrangement of another negotiating meeting on May 16 at the Superintendent of Personnel level, but this was rejected by Local 2008 because of plaintiff's refusal to delay the effectiveness of the new job descriptions.
As stated above, there are indications that the work stoppages at Philadelphia and New York were caused in part by this Steubenville dispute, but there is no indication that the T.W.U. members in the northern region and at Altoona, Pa., and Wilmington, Del., where the most substantial work stoppages occurred, knew anything about this dispute. The International Representative in the northern region had only heard of the existence of the work stoppage at Mingo Junction and reported this to Mr. Fassano (a Vice President of Local 2017).
Plaintiff's requests for Findings 21 and 22 are affirmed on this point.
Even if, as counsel for the defendants contends, the Steubenville dispute, and not the scope rules dispute, was the cause of the work stoppages and picketing, plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction at this time to carry out the purposes of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.A. § 151 ff.) in securing the mediation of that minor dispute. Manion et al. v. Kansas City Terminal Railway Co., 1957, 353 U.S. 927, 77 S. Ct. 706, 1 L. Ed. 2d 722, relied on by the defendants, is distinguishable. In that case,
the dispute concerning time claims for penalty pay had been carried through all the levels of management, as provided for in the existing collective bargaining agreement between the parties, and the claims had been rejected. The union sought to bring the dispute before a National Mediation Board invoked by the carrier to assist in resolving another dispute. The carrier refused to discuss the time claims dispute, claiming that it was not mediable and that a provision in the collective bargaining agreement barring appeals from the final decision by the highest level of management after six months prevented any further discussion of the matter since that time had expired. The union called a strike and it was enjoined. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment 'in the light of our decision in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 77 S. Ct. 635, (1 L. Ed. 2d 622) because the dispute here is not pending before the National Railroad Adjustment Board.' The cause was remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the decision and without prejudice to the Court of Appeals to reinstate its judgment if the dispute was submitted to the Adjustment Board by either party within a reasonable time.
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R.R. Co., 1957, 353 U.S. 30, 77 S. Ct. 635, 1 L. Ed. 2d 622, the court sanctioned an injunction against a strike induced by a minor dispute because the Railway Labor Act substituted a reasonable alternative. 353 U.S. 30, at page 41, 77 S. Ct. 635, at page 640. In the opinion of this court, this alternative includes not only the services of the Railroad Adjustment Board, which was created by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 153, as defendants contend, but also the preliminary negotiations through channels established by the parties 'up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes,' which the Act expressly contemplates will precede referral to the Board (45 U.S.C.A. § 153, First (i)) and which procedure the Board was to augment. See, also, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Brown, 5 Cir., 1958, 252 F.2d 149, 153, 154.
In the Manion case, supra, the negotiation procedures established by the parties had been exhausted and the Railroad, relying on the six months limitation period in the collective bargaining agreement, contended that no further procedures were available. Thus, the union was left without any 'reasonable alternative' to a strike. Therefore, the Supreme Court, on the authority of the Chicago River case, supra, denied the injunction unless that alternative was supplied by continuing along the course of negotiation established by Congress from the point at which they had broken off. In the case at bar, the parties are still pursuing, or have open to them, the course of negotiations defined by their collective bargaining agreement, which the Railway Labor Act contemplates will take place before the services of the Railroad Adjustment Board are invoked. Therefore, an injunction is appropriate at this time. This is the rule followed by this court on two previous occasions. See Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Transport Workers Union, D.C.E.D.Pa.1957, 178 F.Supp. 30, and Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Local 2013 of United R. Workers, etc., D.C.E.D.Pa.1959, 178 F.Supp. 53.
D. Other Disputes.
The record discloses that at Canton, Ohio, Wilmington, Del., Philadelphia, Pa., and other locations on the plaintiff's railroad there were various pending grievances concerning the application and interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. These local grievances were contributing causes to work stoppages at these points. These grievances, including the grievances referred to above as the Steubenville Dispute, should have been processed by the T.W. U. and its local unions under Section 7-B of the contract (Exhibit P-1A). See authorities cited under Steubenville Dispute above.
Work stoppages occurred at the following locations on the following dates and continued until May 19, 1960, after service of the May 18, 1960, Temporary Restraining Order of this court and the back-to-work directive of the T.W.U. (see Exhibit D-3):
Location Pickets Date
/////--- /////-- //--
Mingo Junction, Ohio Yes May 16, 1960
Conway, Pa. n7 Yes May 17, 1960
Philadelphia, Pa. Yes May 18, 1960
Wilmington, Del. (Shops) Yes May 18, 1960
Altoona, Pa. (Shops) Yes May 18, 1960
Oil City, Pa. Yes May 18, 1960
Erie, Pa. Yes May 18, 1960
Elmira, Pa. Yes May 18, 1960
Sunbury, Pa. Yes May 18, 1960
Buffalo, N. Y. Yes May 18, 1960
Canton, Ohio Yes May 18, 1960
Cleveland, Ohio Yes May 18, 1960
New York Region (including Yes 12:01 A. M. on
New Jersey Shore Points) May 19, 1960
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