Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

05/19/60 International Ladies' v. National Labor

May 19, 1960

INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION, AFL-CIO, PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, RESPONDENT. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, PETITIONER,

v.

BERNHARD-ALTMANN



Before BURTON,* WILBUR K. MILLER and FAHY, Circuit Judges.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.

Texas Corporation, Respondent. 1960.CDC.66

APPELLATE PANEL:

DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE BURTON

The General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board filed a complaint against the Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corporation, an employer, manufacturing knitwear for interstate commerce at San Antonio, Texas. The complaint charged the employer with entering into an exclusive recognition agreement with the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, at a time when the union did not represent a majority of the corporation's employees in any appropriate bargaining unit. It also charged the employer with thus contributing to the support of the union in violation of § 8(a)(2), and with interfering with the free exercise of rights, guaranteed to the employees by § 7 of such Act, in violation of § 8(a)(1). In a separate complaint the General Counsel also charged that the union had violated § 8(b)(1)by entering into the above-mentioned agreement with the employer and thus restraining and coercing some of the latter's employees in the free exercise of rights guaranteed to them by § 7. After a hearing in which the cases were consolidated, the trial examiner issued an intermediate report recommending that each complaint be dismissed in its entirety. However, the Board, on exceptions filed by the General Counsel, disagreed with the trial examiner's conclusions. The Board found that the employer and the union had respectively engaged in the alleged unfair labor practices. It accordingly ordered each of them to cease and desist from such practices and to hold a representative election. One member concurred in part and dissented in part. 122 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1297. The union now asks this Court to set aside the Board's order, whereas the Board asks that its order be enforced. Except for filing its answer, the employer had not participated in these proceedings.

The facts found by the Board are supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole and are conclusive here. 61 Stat. 148, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(e). Our jurisdiction is not questioned.

Beginning in 1956, the union engaged in a campaign to organize the employer's plant. It obtained a substantial number of authorization cards signed by employees designating the union as their bargaining representative. In July 1957, a number of the employees struck in protest against a wage reduction and the union, on behalf of some of the strikers, endeavored to settle the controversy. On August 30, 1957, during these negotiations, a "memorandum of understanding" was signed by the employer and the union. In that memorandum the employer expressly recognized the union as the exclusive bargaining agent for its production and shipping employees, and the union stated that it had been designated by a majority of such production and shipping employees to act as the exclusive bargaining representative of all of such employees. There was testimony that the union maintained a running check of the number of authorization cards it held against a list of the employees believed by it to be working in the bargaining unit. When the union's Regional Director became convinced that the union had obtained cards from a majority of the workers in the unit, he so stated to the employer. The latter made no independent check of the cards and took no other steps to investigate the assertion. Likewise, there is no evidence that at the time of concluding the agreement the union attempted to obtain a definitive list of the employees within the proposed bargaining unit.

In October 1957, the memorandum was followed by a formal collective-bargaining agreement. This covered many subjects appropriate for such a contract and recited that a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit had designated the union as their exclusive bargaining representative. The Board found that, on the critical date of August 30, the union had not been designated as a bargaining agent, either by the votes or by the signed cards of a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit. The union disputes the Board's finding of lack of majority status on August 30. While there were questions raised as to the status of some employees, the Board was justified in the finding that the union did not represent a majority of the employees in the designated unit on the critical date.3

The intent of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and especially § 7, is that the decision whether or not to be represented by a bargaining representative and also the choice of that representative shall be the uncoerced decision of a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit. Obstruction of that freedom of choice, by either the employer or the union, deprives some of the employees of this guaranteed right and is an unfair labor practice under § 8. It is difficult to conceive of a clearer restraint on the employees' right of self-organization than for their employer to enter into a collective-bargaining agreement with a minority of the employees. If upheld, that action would foreclose any other choice of a bargaining representative by a majority of the workers in the unit. It would not only impose the minority's bargaining agent upon the nonparticipating majority, it would also practically preclude the majority, during the term of the contract, from casting off the union as bargaining representative. Even if the employees might surmount the difficulties inherent in challenging the established order by presenting a petition for decertification under § 9(c),4 it is quite likely, under the Board's decisions, that the "contract-bar" rule would prevent the majority from asserting the union's lack of majority status during the two-year term of the contract. It has been held repeatedly by the Board that in a decertification proceeding, where the contract bar has been asserted, the petitioners are not permitted to show the lack of majority status of the union at the time the contract was made.5

It has been repeatedly found an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(1) and (2) for an employer to conclude a collective-bargaining agreement with a minority union.6 In most of these cases there were aggravating factors such as the presence of a rival union or the imposition of a union security provision, but those cases do not appear to turn on the presence of these aggravating factors, nor are these factors always present. We see no material distinction from the viewpoint of the employees' § 7 organizational rights between the rival union situation, where there is interference in the choice between bargaining agents, and the instant cases, where the interference affects the choice whether to bargain through a collective representative or individually.

As early as N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp ., 301 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1937), it has been recognized that implicit in the duty of the employer to recognize the majority's representative of his employees as the exclusive bargaining representative is the correlative duty to deal with no agent other than that chosen by the majority.7 Also implicit is the obligation on the part of the employer to make sure that the representative does in fact represent a majority of the employees. Conversely, it is the duty of those who seek to establish themselves as exclusive bargaining agents to make sure that they have the mandate of those in whose name they speak.

Section 8(b)(1), as enacted in 1947, prohibits unions from invading the rights of employees under § 7 in a fashion comparable to the activities of employers prohibited under § 8(a)(1). That the provisions were intended to be parallel is indicated by the similarity of the language employed, and is confirmed by the legislative history of the provisions.8

Section 8(a)(1), as it appeared in the original Wagner Act as § 8(1), applied only to employer conduct. The major purpose which the sponsors of the 1947 amendments sought to achieve was to impose on unions the same restrictions as those imposed by § 8(1) on employers respecting intrusion on protected employee activity. The omission of the word "interference" from subsection (b)(1) may not be devoid of significance when considering whether labor organizations are permitted wider latitude in peacefully persuading employees to organize than is permitted employers in opposing collective bargaining. But where union activities go beyond the level of persuasion and amount to a foreclosure of the exercise of § 7 rights by the employees, we find no basis for holding that the provisions should have a different meaning when applied to a labor organization than when applied to an employer.

This Court's decision in Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local Union No. 639 (Curtis Bros.) v. N.L.R.B ., - U.S. App. D.C. -, 274 F.2d 551, decided November 26, 1958, and the Supreme Court's affirmance of that decision, 362 U.S. 274, do not militate against enforcement of the Board's order in the instant cases.9 In the Curtis Bros . case a minority union was engaged in peaceful picketing in an effort to secure the recognition of a union which recently had been defeated in a certification election. This Court held that such picketing was not an unfair labor practice. The instant cases involve much more direct interference and restraint of § 7 rights than did the Curtis Bros . case. In the instant cases the recognition of the minority union is a fait accompli depriving the majority of the employees of their guaranteed right to choose their own representative. In the Curtis Bros . case the issue was not ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.