The opinion of the court was delivered by: WILLSON
The United States has filed an eight count information charging the defendant Melvin Henry Cummings with a violation of the provisions of the Automobile Information Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1231 et seq. This statute was enacted July 7, 1958 and provides in part that '* * * Every manufacturer of new automobiles distributed in commerce shall * * *' affix thereto a label on which such manufacturers shall '* * * endorse clearly, distinctly and legibly true and correct entries * * *' disclosing certain information concerning such automobile.
Defendant challenges the constitutionality and the applicability of this statute to him because, he says in his brief, and this court understands that it is conceded, that the cars in question were shipped from Michigan in interstate commerce and thereafter came to rest in his showroom in Pittsburgh and were sold locally. The defendant says '* * * the whole nature of his business is the retail sale of automobiles to the general public in and about Allegheny County, Pennsylvania * * *' Defendant concedes, of course, that Congress has the power to regulate commerce among the several states but he says the interstate character of the transaction came to rest at his place of business in Pittsburgh and it was only when the interstate commerce feature of the transaction ended that the labels were alleged to have been removed.
Defendant contends that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, does not permit Congress to regulate acts of retail automobile dealers engaged solely in commerce within a state and that the Tenth Amendment strictly prohibits Congress from making laws which regulate intrastate activities. Under the circumstances says the defendant, the information filed against him is based upon an invalid statute and violates the safeguards afforded to him under the Fifth Amendment. He therefore seeks a dismissal of the charges against him.
To this court's knowledge this is the first challenge made against the constitutionality of this statute. The legislative history of the Automobile Information Disclosure Act is found in the U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News 1958, p. 2902. The legislative history says that the purpose of the bill is as follows: House Report, No. 1958, June 24, 1958.
'* * * The primary purpose of the bill is to disclose the manufacturer's suggested retail price of the new automobile (passenger car or station wagon) so that the buyer will know what it is. This information is not available now.
'The present-day buyer of a new automobile is usually completely bewildered and unable to find his way through the marketing jungle in which the automobile dealers have become involved.
'This bill will restore the confidence of the automobile buyer. The disclosure of the manufacturer's suggested * * * price will help to minimize the advertising extravagances indulged in by some automobile dealers. * * *'
The need for legislation is discussed here and it is indicated that the bill was directed at the abuse of price packing found by the congressional committee to exist in the automobile business. The committee indicated that some six abuses were prevalent which this bill sought to correct. The House Report states:
'* * * The Automotive News reported the first quarter 1958 output of automobiles at 1,238,710, compared with 1,790,597 during the same period in 1957, 1,615,731 in 1956, and 1,995,543 in 1955 a banner year. At the time unsold used car stocks in the hands of dealers jumped to 869,000, the highest since April 1, 1956, and unsold used car stocks reached a 4-year high.
'The drop in automobile production has much to do with the fact that steel production has dropped to approximately 58 percent of the level of last year, demonstrating the effect of the automobile production on other basic industry. * * *'
Defendant cites as principal authority for his contention that the instant statute is invalid, the famous Schechter decision, (A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States) 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570. In that decision the Supreme Court held invalid the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. Defendant cites other decisions pointing to the proposition that even though necessity and in some cases an emergency is present, ...