or dealer can unilaterally attach without being put at a competitive disadvantage. * * *'
Defendant cites as principal authority for his contention that the instant statute is invalid, the famous Schechter decision, (A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States) 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570. In that decision the Supreme Court held invalid the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. Defendant cites other decisions pointing to the proposition that even though necessity and in some cases an emergency is present, nevertheless Congress is still bound by constitutional limitations when it comes to the regulation of intrastate business.
It is believed that this case presents however, a clear cut illustration of an instance where congress, given an express power by the Constitution, may effectuate that power so as to correct an abuse affecting interstate commerce, even though in doing so, the congressional an instance where Congress, given an a purely intrastate transaction. In the instant case that burden if any, is the simple requirement that the label showing the manufacturers suggested retail price shall remain affixed to the automobile until it reaches the ultimate purchaser.
In the now landmark decision of the Supreme Court, National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1, at page 37, 57 S. Ct. 615, at page 624, 81 L. Ed. 893, the following language appears:
'* * * Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control. * * *'
That decision upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act. It was upheld on the theory set forth in the quoted language. It seems to this court that the doctrine of substantial relation to interstate commerce has applicability to the present situation. The evil which Congress sought to correct was the inability of an individual purchaser to determine the price of a new car. The purchaser's confusion resulted in the reduction of interstate commerce in that automobiles could not be sold. This is turn diminished the demand for steel and in consequence generated a depression of activity in all aspects in that basic industry of the country which necessarily moved in interstate commerce, thereby producing a further adverse effect upon the flow of interstate commerce.
It seems correct to state that a sale of a car by a local dealer is purely commerce within a state. That transaction has such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce, as is developed in the legislative history, so as to constitutionally sanction this regulation as an appropriate control to protect interstate commerce from burdens or obstructions.
Counsel for the parties have cited many other decisions on this general subject. It is believed that the several decisions cited by the government are applicable here, notably the Shreveport Rate Case (Houston, East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States), 234 U.S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833, 58 L. Ed. 1341; and United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 68 S. Ct. 331, 92 L. Ed. 297. Defendant has cited in addition to the Schechter decision, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160 and other decisions. However this court must conclude that the statute here is constitutional and otherwise a valid exercise of congressional power.
Order of Court
And now, this 18th day of May, 1960, motion of defendant to dismiss the information is denied. Defendant is directed to appear for trial at the next criminal jury term.
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