Appeal, No. 157, March T., 1959, from order of Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, June T., 1955, No. 200, in case of Howard Marshll v. Ambridge District Sportsmen's Association et al. Order reversed.
Myron E. Rowley, with him James E. Rowley and Ralph E. Smith, for appellant.
No argument was made nor brief submitted for appellee.
Before Jones, C.j., Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Bok and Eagen, JJ.
OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE EAGEN.
The appellant is a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of Pennsylvania. It owns a parcel of real estate in Beaver County, Pennsylvania, on which it maintains a club house and "various installations attractive to sportsmen," not the least of which, apparently, is a bar from which are dispensed intoxicating liquors.
On May 9, 1955, appellee, Howard Marshall, while in the club taproom, was informed by the bartender on duty that certain accusations had been made against Marshall's sons relative to their alleged pilfering of a couple of bottles of "pop" from the premises. (Both Marshall and the bartender, Lease, were members of the board of directors of the club). The record reveals that Marshall took personal offense at this bit of information and that his aggravation because of it finally brought about the events that later transpired. After being so advised, it seems he left the barroom, attended to some of his chores on and about the premises of the club, returned to the bar, began agitating the issue, labeled the bartender in spelled-out version what we will abbreviate as an "s.o.b." and, for his chivalry, was thumped by the barkeep. In the ensuing scuffle, he came out second best, his right leg having thereby become broken.
To help alleviate his pain, Marshall sued both the bartender, Jacob (Jack) Lease and the association. The jury, after returning about three times for further instructions finally found for plaintiff as against both defendants. Lease did not appeal.
The association on this appeal contends that the lower court committed reversible error by, among
other things, refusing its motion for a judgment non obstante veredicto.
The liability of the association is attempted to be made out solely on the basis of the doctrine of respondeat superior. Appellee asserts Lease to have been an employee of the association and, from this, argues that ...