the hearing when their pleas were entered. Defendant's constitutional right to effective counsel devoted solely to his own interest was not violated; he was not prejudiced in any way by the joint representation.
There was some suggestion that his counsel should have vilified Langston to a greater extent than was done, i.e., that his counsel should have emphasized that he was the thief and defendant the dupe. But the presentence report showed Langston to be a habitual criminal and the admitted principal in the charges of selling stolen goods. At the hearing Langston frankly admitted that he was responsible for the predicament of his co-defendant and requested leniency for him. The record will disclose that the court was fully aware of Langston's major culpability and sentenced him accordingly. The defendant, however, admitted that he was Langston's agent on both occasions, with full knowledge that his complicity was criminal.
The defendant complains that his counsel failed to minimize defendant's part in selling the stolen merchandise, i.e., that he played only a minor part as a favor to his friend, Langston. But the court was fully aware that defendant was not the thief and merely an aider and abettor, although it does appear at the 'hearing to vacate' that defendant actually participated in transporting the second load of stolen goods from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to Brooklyn, New York, for disposition.
I find as a fact that the defendant was adequately represented when he pleaded guilty; that defendant and his counsel accurately portrayed his relationship with Langston in mitigation of the offense. In trying to help defendant, his counsel went far beyond the call of duty by procuring for defendant an examination by a psychiatrist who donated his services and rendered a report to the court. They also were instrumental in subsequently procuring the reduction of defendant's sentence. It is regrettable that the good faith, diligence and zeal displayed by these earnest young lawyers serving without compensation in defendant's behalf should be rewarded only by unmerited charges of disloyalty and accusations of improbable verity.
I find as a fact that the defendant was not induced by his counsel or any other persons to plead guilty by duress, coercion, fear or misrepresentation.
I find as a fact that Attorney Gross did not kick defendant on the ankle or otherwise attempt to silence him or to suppress facts at the sentence hearing. As the transcript will disclose, defendant was permitted to say anything he desired to the court and took full advantage of the opportunity. He made no complaint to the court concerning his attorney's conduct and no untoward incident occurred which was observed by the court.
I find as a fact that defendant was not advised by his counsel or by any other person that any imprisonment that might be imposed would run concurrently with imprisonment for parole violation. Simply because he subjectively harbored such an impression, or a hope of leniency, or because he did not know when he entered his guilty pleas that he would or might be subjected to a more severe sentence than anticipated, did not deprive his guilty pleas of their voluntary character. Cf. Friedman v. United States, 8 Cir., 1952, 200 F.2d 690, 696; United States v. Shneer, 3 Cir., 1952, 194 F.2d 598, 600.
I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Donald C. Winson, Esq. for his excellent brief and the time and trouble taken pursuant to his appointment as counsel for the defendant in this proceeding.
The sentences imposed were authorized by law, and the court had jurisdiction to impose them since there was no denial or infringement of defendant's constitutional rights.
An appropriate order will be entered denying the motion to vacate sentence.