been joined by a youth of some 17 years of age; three of the girls were 15 years of age and one was 16 years of age. Noting at the time of his entrance that there were several people present, whom he knew to be homosexuals, he interrogated the girls as to their presence. Not being satisfied with the answers given to him he caused them to accompany him to the Nineteenth Police District where he notified their parents. Upon arrival of the parents at the Police Station the girls accompanied their parents home. No complaint on the part of the parents as to Captain Rizzo's action had been testified to in this case and apparently the parents of the youngsters were perfectly satisfied with his actions. While the Court does not condone even temporary detention of innocent persons, it does not appear from the foregoing that his action in this regard was other than in the best interests of the children themselves and that certainly there was no intent on his part to harass the individuals involved or deny them any rights granted to them by the United States Constitution or the statutes of the United States.
Another claim made by plaintiff Haifetz is that on more than one occasion Captain Rizzo threatened that he would keep raiding the place until he drove Haifetz out of business. Captain Rizzo denies this. However, the record clearly indicates that at the hearing before Magistrate Quinn on the 12th day of February, 1959, Rizzo asked the Magistrate at the hearing to do something so that he could close the place permanently. I am asked to find from this that Rizzo unwarrantedly attempted to drive plaintiff Haifetz out of business. I cannot so find. The very tenor of the request itself indicates that Rizzo was looking to the processes of law for guidance. I have no doubt that Rizzo did state emphatically to Haifetz and on more than one occasion that he would do everything he could to see that the breaches of peace occurring in and at the Coffee Shop would not be continued and that law and order must prevail. It would certainly be stretching the meaning of words far beyond ordinary context to interpret what has been said above as an intention to deprive Haifetz, or any one else, of rights, privileges and immunities protected by Section 1983 of Title 42 U.S.C.A. From these words it is just as easy to assume that Captain Rizzo meant that he intended to do everything in his power within the framework of the law to see that breaches of law did not occur in his district. I have no doubt that the verbal exchanges between the two men were spirited but I can find from the entire record no unlawful intent by Captain Rizzo to deprive plaintiff Haifetz of his Constitutional or statutory rights.
No legal discussion of the issues involved in this case is necessary. The case turns entirely upon questions of fact. Plaintiff Haifetz ran a disorderly place of business to the extent that it became a neighborhood nuisance. What Captain Rizzo did over the period of time related showed remarkable restraint in protecting, rather than destroying, the rights of Haifetz and his patrons. Haifetz himself showed a total disregard for the rights and privileges accorded by law to his neighbors and to the public generally. Many neighbors testified as to the operation of the place and in the manner above described. Only two testified to the contrary and the Court does not believe their testimony. Under the circumstances, Haifetz has shown no wrongdoing on the part of defendant Rizzo which would entitle him to an injunction or damages. There is, therefore, no necessity to hear any testimony as to damages, no liability having been shown.
In view of what has been said above, it becomes unnecessary to re-examine the legal proposition inherent in this case, as to whether the City of Philadelphia is a 'person' within the meaning of Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. The foregoing may be considered as the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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