Appeal, No. 178, Jan. T., 1959, from order of Court of Common Pleas No. 5 of Philadelphia County, Sept. T., 1957, No. 1710, in case of Mary Boreth v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment. Order affirmed. Proceedings on appeal from decision of zoning board of adjustment refusing to grant variance. Before WEINROTT, J. Adjudication filed dismissing appeal, and order entered. Property owner appealed.
Herman Toll, with him Morton Craine, for appellant.
Gordon Cavanaugh, Assistant City Solicitor, with him James L. Stern, Deputy City Solicitor, and David Berger, City Solicitor, for Zoning Board of Adjustment, appellee.
Before Jones, C.j., Bell, Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Bok and Mcbride, JJ.
OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE COHEN
Mary Boreth, appellant, filed an application for a use registration permit to operate a beauty shop in the basement of her premises. The application was refused and the zoning board, after a public hearing, also refused to issue the permit to her. Thereafter, she took an appeal to the court of common pleas contending that the operation of her beauty shop is a "home occupation" as that term is defined in the Philadelphia ordinance. From an order dismissing her appeal, she took the present appeal.
The appellant is co-owner, with her husband, of premises 1247 Levick Street, Philadelphia, which is located in an area zoned "D" Residential under the zoning regulations. However, a beauty shop is not a permitted use under the regulations set forth in Section 14-207(1) of the Philadelphia Code of General Ordinances.
Despite this, appellant seeks to avail herself of Section 14-216, which provides for accessory uses that are permitted in residential districts. She contends that a beauty shop is a "home occupation" as that phrase is defined in Section 14-102(17): "Any lawful occupation customarily conducted in a dwelling as an incidental use."
In Gold v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 401, 143 A.2d 59 (1958), we held that a one-chair barber shop conducted in the basement of premises located in a "D" Residential District in Philadelphia was not a "home occupation" and, therefore, was not permitted as an accessory use. What Mr. Justice ARNOLD said there at pp. 403, 404 is particularly appropriate to the instant case: "Whether this is a use 'customarily conducted' in a dwelling as an incidental use has not heretofore been determined by this Court. It is to be noted that the use must not only be 'incidental' to, but must
also be 'customarily conducted' in, a dwelling. Thus, that it might be incidental to his living in the home is not sufficient, and merely because he would have only one chair, operate only by appointment, or display no signs, would not determine the matter. A practical and sensible approach to the question leaves no doubt that this is not a customary use of a dwelling, such as sewing or cooking might be. Barbering is a commercial use, and not ordinarily or customarily conducted in a home. It is a business ordinarily conducted in a business shop or building."
The appellant seeks to avoid the impact of that decision by attempting to display factual distinctions applicable to beauty shops as contradistinguished to barber shops. She also urges the similarity between beauty culture and homemaking, millinery work, dressmaking, and sewing as home occupations customarily conducted in a home. These ...