must be harm to the general public in the form of undue restriction of interstate commerce. An appreciable part of such commerce must be the subject of the monopoly, restraint, or conspiracy. And a general allegation of the forming of such a combination or conspiracy with resulting injury to the public and to the plaintiff is not enough. While detail is not necessary, it is essential that the complaint allege facts from which it can be determined as a matter of law that by reason of intent, tendency, or the inherent nature of the contemplated acts, the conspiracy was reasonably calculated to prejudice the public interest by unduly restricting the free flow of interstate commerce. * * *'
As to The Scranton Times and its reporter, George Clark, it will suffice to say that the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment precludes any claim by plaintiffs against them under the antitrust laws of the United States. As no details of what part either the 'Times' or Clark played in the alleged conspiracy it would appear that reference is had to various news items of plaintiffs' numerous court appearances. There is nothing to indicate libel and even if so, certainly no violation of the antitrust laws.
The case against Judge Murphy and the five employees of the United States Penitentiary is likewise easily disposed of. It is hornbook law that so long as a judge has jurisdiction he is not civilly liable to the parties in a law suit for his rulings in a case.
In Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347, 80 U.S. 335, 347, 20 L. Ed. 646, Justice Field speaking for the Court said:
'Nor can this exemption of the judges from civil liability be affected by the motives with which their judicial acts are performed. The purity of their motives cannot in this way be the subject of judicial inquiry. This was adjudged in the case of Floyd and Barker, reported by Coke, in 1608, where it was laid down that the judges of the realm could not be drawn in question for any supposed corruption impeaching the verity of their records, except before the king himself, and it was observed that if they were required to answer otherwise, it would 'tend to the scandal and subversion of all justice, and those who are the most sincere, would not be free from continual calumniations."
See also 48 C.J.S. Judges § 63; Allen v. Biggs, D.C.E.D.Pa., 62 F.Supp. 229; Ginsburg v. Stern, 3 Cir., 263 F.2d 458.
In Cooper v. O'Connor, 69 App.D.C. 100, 99 F.2d 135, 141, 118 A.L.R. 1440, the court said:
'In several of the cases in which the rule of immunity has been applied the rationalization used has been that the particular defendant was a judicial officer, or was engaged in a judicial determination, or was so closely associated with the judicial process as to make necessary his protection from harassment in order to protect the judicial process. * * *
'* * * the rule as now declared in many cases has been applied, not only to officials judicial and quasi-judicial, but to executive officers generally, such as the Postmaster General, the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Members of the United States Parole Board, the Parole Executive, the Warden of a Federal penitentiary, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, the Chairman of the Tariff Commission, a building inspector, the United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the Chief of Record and Pension Office of the War Department.'
Certainly the five employees of the penitentiary, defendants herein, were 'so closely associated with the judicial process as to make necessary (their) protection from harassment in order to protect the judicial process,' there being nothing in the complaint to indicate any other activities on their part aside from the performance of their duties as penitentiary employees.
Accordingly, the action should and will be dismissed.