Appeal, No. 356, Oct. T., 1958, from order of Court of Common Pleas No. 5 of Philadelphia County, June T., 1956, No. 8010, in case of Earl J. Branch v. Charmaine Merle Adams Branch. Appeal quashed.
Edward K. Nichols, Jr., with him A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., and Norris, Schmidt, Green, Harris & Higginbotham, for appellant.
Matthew W. Bullock, Jr., with him Bullock and Allen, for appellee.
Before Rhodes, P.j., Hirt, Gunther, Wright, Woodside, Ervin, and Watkins, JJ.
[ 188 Pa. Super. Page 589]
The court below entered a decree of divorce a.v.m. in favor of Earl J. Branch and against his wife, Charmaine Merle Adams Branch on the ground of adultery. The defendant did not appeal, but William D. Coverdale, who had been named correspondent in the action, did file an appeal from the divorce decree. The plaintiff filed a motion to quash the appeal on the ground that the correspondent had no authority to take it.
The question is whether a person named correspondent in a divorce action can appeal from a decree granting the plaintiff a divorce on the ground of adultery.
The right of appeal from the action of a lower court is not constitutionally ordained in Pennsylvania; such right is conferred solely by statute and does not otherwise exist. Robinson Twp. School District v. Houghton, 387 Pa. 236, 242, 128 A.2d 58 (1956). The right of review pertains merely to the remedy; it is not a natural, inherent or vested right. It exists as a legislative privilege to be granted or withheld as seems best to the legislature. 4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1. This is particularly true of appeals to our Court, which, being a statutory court, has no appellate jurisdiction except that prescribed by the legislature. 2 P.L.E. Appeals § 1.
Section 60, of the Act of May 2, 1929, P.L. 1237, 23 PS § 60, codifying, revising and consolidating the Divorce Law, provides for appeals in the following language: "Either of the parties in any suit or action for divorce may appeal therefrom to the Superior Court, in the manner provided by law for such appeals ..."
"Either" means each of two; one or the other of two alternatives, one of two. Black's Law Dictionary, Merriam-Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Edition. Sometimes, "especially formerly" (see above dictionaries) or when "used loosely" (See Brown's Estate,
[ 188 Pa. Super. Page 590343]
Pa. 19, 26, 21 A.2d 898 (1941)) "either" can be used in the sense of "any". Nevertheless, according to its common and approved usage "either" means "one of two" and not "any". The Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, § 33, 46 PS § 533, provides that words in ...