is not to be considered, but only that the discretion to be exercised is broader.'
It appears, therefore, that under the present state of the law, the factors to be considered by a court in determining whether or not to transfer the action under 1404(a) are established by the Gulf Oil Corp. case, and the degree of discretion to be exercised by the court is established by the Norwood case. In applying the law to the facts of this case, the hearing judge is of the opinion that this case should be transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland for the following reasons:
(a) The law of Maryland is applicable
and judges of the Maryland District Court are more familiar with that law than the judges of this court.
(b) Another action involving this same accident had been instituted in the Superior Court of Baltimore City and, upon removal, is presently before the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
(c) Most of the lay witnesses are from Maryland.
(d) Plaintiff was first treated at the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore.
(e) The scene of the accident would be more readily available to the jury if a viewing became desirable.
(f) The case will be reached much more rapidly in the District of Maryland because of the less crowded docket.
Plaintiff's choice of forum and the case of Mazinski v. Dight, D.C.W.D.Pa.1951, 99 F.Supp. 192, relied on by plaintiff in opposition to defendant's motion, have been given due consideration. However, with regard to the degree of discretion to be exercised by the court, the Mazinski case, in light of the Norwood case, does not represent the present state of the law. It is the opinion of the undersigned that the interests of justice would be better served if this case were transferred to the District Court of Maryland. See Cox v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., D.C.E.D.Pa.1958, 163 F.Supp. 682.