in Russano are present, and that the latter decision in no way controls the instant case.
The Court also rejects defendants' argument that the evidence failed to establish their guilty knowledge of the stolen character of the cloth. The evidence on this point was overwhelmingly against the defendants.
Initially, defendant Sussman admitted that he and Nassau purchased the stolen cloth in the amounts and at the approximate times alleged in the indictment. In early February of 1954, a meeting was held at Martin Weiner's store in Philadelphia. Among others, those present included Martin Weiner, Lichtman and Sussman. Weiner testified that at this meeting he informed Sussman that the cloth was stolen, and explained the method by which it had been obtained. Sussman in turn assured those present that his part of the transaction was 'perfectly safe.' At this meeting the financial arrangements were made. All transactions were to be in cash to avoid the tracing which might be possible were checks used. Sussman suggested that all billing be done under the bogus name of 'Samuel Miller.'
That such plans were later carried out was shown by Sussman's admissions that the cloth was received without covering invoices, and that at his direction 'Samuel Miller' invoices were printed and completed upon receipt of each shipment.
Testifying as to the meeting, Lichtman substantially corroborated the statements of Weiner. He questioned, however, whether Sussman was actually told at that time that the cloth was stolen. Lichtman stated that in August of 1955 he advised both Sussman and Nassau in detail as to the entire operation. Sussman then told Lichtman that he already knew about it, having learned thereof from a Mr. Chorney, an alleged co-conspirator. In this respect, Lichtman also testified that in April of 1955, Mr. Chorney was fully advised as to how the cloth had been stolen from the Quartermaster Depot.
Chamberland, a co-conspirator who entered a plea of guilty, testified that while he was not a principal at the February, 1954, meeting, he overheard a conversation of Sussman, Weiner and Lichtman. In it, Chamberland said, each party assured the others that his part of the transaction was 'safe.' He said there was talk as to whether or not the cloth could be identified, and as to the fact that Sussman intended to export the cloth to avoid tracing. Chamberland added that sometime in 1954 he became suspicious about the cloth and questioned his employer, Robert Lichtman. Lichtman, he said, told him not only that the cloth was stolen but also that the New York purchasers were fully aware thereof from the very inception of their dealings.
In addition to such direct testimony of guilty knowledge, there were inferences of guilt raised by many acts of the defendants. The Quartermaster tickets, mill marks, proof or truth marks, were all removed from the stolen cloth in the presence of the defendants. Sussman and Nassau likewise forged the endorsement of 'Samuel Miller' on the numerous checks made out in that name. Sussman also had an 'extensively' greater quantity of uniform cloth for sale than anyone else during this period, and apparently could offer for sale some types of cloth which even the mills could not supply. The prices paid by Sussman and Nassau for the stolen cloth were likewise considerably below the current market.
To hold that the jury did not have a sufficient basis upon which to find the requisite guilty knowledge on the part of the defendants would be utterly unrealistic. No authority is needed for the proposition that the credibility of the witnesses was for the jury. Their decision should not be disturbed.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered that the defendants' motions for new trial and for judgment of acquittal be and the same are denied.
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