that I had reached the office of the defendant.
'12. I learned recently that the S.S. 'FEDERAL VOYAGER' was in the Port of New York in July, 1958.'
The 1958-1959 issue of the Manhattan, New York City, Telephone Directory has the following listing, as well as that quoted above:
'Atlantic Commerce and Shipping Co. Inc., 60 E. 42 MUryhil 2-3912'
Defendant has filed an affidavit (Document No. 13 in Clerk's file), in opposition to the above motion, containing this language:
'Defendant is a Canadian corporation, with offices in Montreal, Canada, with which said Atlantic has had some business dealings in the past of a specific, sporadic nature. Atlantic has on occasion advised the named defendant of charter opportunities for vessels owned by the defendant for which services it has been paid by Federal Commerce and Navigation Company, Ltd. However, Atlantic does not act as agent for defendant's vessels, keeps no accounts for defendant, is not authorized to accept process for defendant, nor can it act on behalf of defendant without defendant's specific approval. Deponent is not able to state whether Atlantic was acting on behalf of defendant at the time of the alleged accident but states that, as of the date of service of process herein, it was not acting as the defendant's managing or steamship agent and that it is beyond Atlantic's authority to accept process on the defendant's behalf.'
Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) and 1406(a), this suit may only be transferred to the Southern District of New York if it could 'have been brought' there. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(c) provides that defendant may be sued in that District if it is 'doing business' there.
The record shows that the defendant has an office in New York and that the ship involved in this accident was present in that port as recently as last July. Defendant's affidavit does not deny that it is 'doing business' in the Southern District of New York, but only alleges that Atlantic Commerce & Shipping Co., Inc. (herein called 'Atlantic') is not its authorized, or a proper, agent to receive service of process. Under these circumstances, this record justifies a finding that the suit could 'have been brought' in the Southern District of New York.
On this record, it is clear that this was a normal District for plaintiff to select in instituting its action, since the accident happened here and plaintiff worked here. Under the facts present in this record, the plaintiff is entitled to have his motion granted. The absence of any personal jurisdiction over the defendant by this court does not prevent the transfer of this action to another Federal District Court for the reasons so well stated by the late Chief Judge Parker in Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc., v. Thomsen, 4 Cir., 1955, 218 F.2d 514, 515-517.
See, also, Petroleum Financial Corp. v. Stone, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1953, 116 F.Supp. 426.
In All States Freight v. Modarelli, 3 Cir., 1952, 196 F.2d 1010, Judge Goodrich pointed out, at page 1011, that 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) avoided the danger of having a plaintiff's action barred by the statute of limitations through having to start another suit in the forum found to be appropriate. This reasoning seems equally applicable to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1406(a).
Since there are several cases
using language which, if applicable to the facts of this case, would result in denial of the transfer and since the plaintiff would be barred by the statute of limitations if the transfer is denied, the trial judge finds that the order granting the transfer involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate sermination of the litigation.
The Report of the Committee on Judiciary of the House of Representatives
on Public Law 85-919 (28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b)) listed one category of cases in which interlocutory appeals under that law would be proper, as follows: '(d) Cases relating to the transfer of the action where it is claimed that the transfer is not authorized by law.' Cf. Milbert v. Bison Laboratories, Inc., 3 Cir., 260 F.2d 431. In Deepwater Exploration Co. v. Andrew Weir Ins. Co., D.C.E.D.La.1958, 167 F.Supp. 185, the court points out that Chief Judge Parker stated that the drafters of this law intended this category to cover 'those cases in which transfer is ordered and it is claimed that the transferee court 'would have had no jurisdiction."
By granting the certification provided for in Public Law 85-919, there is no need to grant a stay of proceedings and the undersigned would not grant such a stay in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, an order will be entered transferring this action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and the statement contemplated by Public Law 85-919 will be included in the order.