This so-called 'solicitation plus' doctrine was modified by the Pennsylvania Act of September 26, 1951, P.L. 1475, Sec. 22, 15 P.S.Pa. § 2852-1011, as amended, which in pertinent part provides: 'C. * * * the entry of any corporation into this Commonwealth for the doing of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing a single act in this Commonwealth for such purpose with the intention of thereby initiating a series of such acts, shall constitute 'doing business."
Said Act represents a clear intent on the part of the Pennsylvania Legislature to increase the protection of its citizens by enlarging the jurisdiction of the Courts of the Commonwealth over foreign corporations. See Florio v. Powder Power Tool Corporation, 3 Cir., 248 F.2d 367. We need not decide whether or not under said Act the Pennsylvania activities of the defendant, Burton Auto Spring Company, constitute the doing of business, for said Act was further amended by Act No. 370, effective September 1, 1957, by the deletion of subparagraph C. 1957, P.L. 711.
By this latter amendment Pennsylvania, we think, reverted to the 'solicitation plus' doctrine. Applying that doctrine to the facts as outlined above we hold that the Pennsylvania activities of the defendant, Burton Auto Spring Company, do not constitute doing business since they fail to show the existence of even solicitation in the generally accepted sense. Assuming arguendo that said facts disclose solicitation within the Commonwealth that is all they do disclose and, therefore, they fall short of the requirement under the 'solicitation plus' doctrine.
Accordingly, we conclude that the second service is invalid for the reason that the defendant, Burton Auto Spring Company, was not 'doing business' within this Commonwealth.
II. In addition, is the second service invalid under Section 2852-1011, subdivision B.
(which was not affected by the aforementioned Act of September 1, 1957) since that section authorizes service only in those cases where the cause of action arises 'out of acts or omissions of (a foreign) corporation within this Commonwealth'? We think so.
In Florio v. Powder Power Tool Corporation, supra (248 F.2d 374), the court, irrespective of the fact that the defective tool had been negligently manufactured in the State of Oregon, held that 'in the absence of legislative history to the contrary, that it was the intent of the Pennsylvania Legislature to regard an injury flowing from the careless manufacture of an instrumentality as the act veritably contemplated by subsection B.'. Thus, it was held in that case that service was valid because the injury occurred in Pennsylvania. In the instant case, however, no 'act' occurred in Pennsylvania, the leaf spring having been manufactured outside this Commonwealth, presumably in Illinois, and the injury having occurred in New Jersey.
III. The first service, we think, was likewise invalid. That W. P. Paul and Miss E. Babis are not authorized by appointment or by law to accept service of process on behalf of the defendant is so clear under the facts as disclosed in the affidavits that we deem any discussion thereon unnecessary.
IV. For reasons herein stated the motion of the defendant, Burton Auto Spring Company, to dismiss the within action will be granted.
An appropriate order will be prepared and submitted.