colliding with the right rear portion of plaintiff's car.
Plaintiff contends that under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, 1929, May 1, P.L. 905, art. X, 1013; 1931, June 22, P.L. 751, § 2; 1937, June 29, P.L. 2329, § 3, 75 Purdon's Pa.Stat.Ann. § 572(b), he had the right of way since he had made an arm signal showing his intention to turn left across the defendant's line of travel. Although Walker, the defendant's driver, did not see that signal, he believed, from some other signal, that the plaintiff intended to execute a left turn. But, even though plaintiff believed he had the right of way, he 'may not rely blindly upon it where he sees that the driver of a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction will not comply with his duty to stop and that a collision will most certainly ensue unless he himself yields his right of way.' Halbach v. Robinson Bros., 173 Pa.Super. 622, 98 A.2d 750, 751. When plaintiff started from a stop in his 1949 Plymouth in order to make a left-hand turn and saw the defendant's vehicle, travelling at 35-40 miles per hour, in its own rightful path, which gave no indication of slackening speed to allow plaintiff to pass in front of it, he should have waited until defendant's vehicle had passed before proceeding and not encroached upon its path. We think his failure to do so was a negligent contributing cause of the accident. It certainly was contributory negligence, for as stated in the Halbach case, supra, 98 A.2d at page 751:
'In short, a driver who takes his chances on crossing a lane of traffic ahead of visible approaching vehicles lawfully therein, is guilty of contributory negligence if he fails to execute the crossing in safety.'
See also, Samuelson v. McClelland, 127 Pa.Super. 209, 193 A. 385.
Walker should have slowed down promptly after having observed that some vehicle intended to make a left turn. His failure to yield the right of way and to so control his car to avoid the collision was a negligent contributing legal cause of the accident.
Conclusions of Law.
1. This court has jurisdiction of this controversy by virtue of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2674.
2. Plaintiff was negligent; his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, and he is thereby precluded from recovery on his claim against the defendant.
3. The defendant's driver was negligent; his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, and defendant is thereby precluded from recovery on its counterclaim against the plaintiff.
An appropriate order will be entered.