in one town is supported by proof that it was committed in a different town * * * within the jurisdiction of the court.' Ledbetter v. United States, supra, 170 U.S. at page 614, 18 S. Ct. at page 777, and see United States v. Ansani, supra, 240 F.2d at page 223; Mellor v. United States, supra, 160 F.2d at page 765.
The letter and spirit of the Sixth Amendment '* * * are satisfied if, where a criminal purpose is executed, the criminal purpose be punished'. Brown v. Elliott, supra, 225 U.S. at page 402, 32 S. Ct. at page 816.
'The distinction runs through the whole criminal law, and it is invariably enough to prove so much of the indictment as shows that the defendant has committed a substantive crime therein specified.' Crain v. United States, supra, 162 U.S. at page 634, 16 S. Ct. at page 955.
While under other circumstances it has been suggested that 'accept and receive' are legal equivalents and synonymous,
the statute reads 'accepts or receives', i.e., two distinct methods of committing the offense. It must, therefore, be so interpreted in the present context. See Egan v. United States, supra, 287 F. at pages 961, 962, and cf. Burton v. United States, 1906, 202 U.S. 344, at page 377, 26 S. Ct. 688, at page 697, 50 L. Ed. 1057, 6 Ann.Cas. 362:
'It was certainly competent for Congress to make the agreement to receive, as well as the receiving of, the forbidden compensation separate distinct offenses. * * * There might be an agreement to receive compensation for services to be rendered without any compensation ever being in fact made, and yet that agreement would be covered by the statute as an offense. Or, compensation might be received for the forbidden services without any previous agreement, and yet the statute would be violated.'
On a motion to dismiss we are limited to the face of the indictment. United States v. Gilboy, supra, 160 F.Supp. at page 442. Where there are several counts each count must be regarded as if it was a separate indictment. Dunn v. United States, 1932, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S. Ct. 189, 76 L. Ed. 356, 80 A.L.R. 161; Gozner v. United States, 6 Cir., 1925, 9 F.2d 603, 604; Murphy v. United States, 6 Cir., 1943, 133 F.2d 622, 627.
Assuming the truth of all well plead allegations we must assume the offense charged occurred in this district. United States v. Valle, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1955, 16 F.R.D. 519, 521. We cannot speculate on the evidence or how the government will undertake to prove the charge.
We do not on a motion to dismiss stop to compare this indictment with #12880. See United States v. Gilboy, supra, 160 F.Supp. at page 442; United States v. Connelly, D.C.D.Minn.1955, 129 F.Supp. 786, at page 791. As to pleading an offense in various forms, see Id., Rule 7(c); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., supra, 344 U.S. at page 225, 73 S. Ct. at page 231. As to multiple indictments, see United States v. Strewl, 2 Cir., 1938, 99 F.2d 474, at page 477; 27 Am.Jur. Indictments, etc., § 16, 139. Here only one offense contra § 202 is charged. It may well be that there is no inconsistency between the several averments in the light of applicable legal principles between Count II, overt act 8 in Count III, and overt act 31 in #12880. We do not here pass judgment upon whether or not Count III and #12880 charge the same offense. That question may better be determined on a plea of double jeopardy. See Poffenbarger v. United States, 8 Cir., 1927, 20 F.2d 42, at page 45; Gavieres v. United States, 1911, 220 U.S. 338, 341, 343, 31 S. Ct. 421, 55 L. Ed. 489; Morgan v. Devine, 1915, 237 U.S. 632, 639 et seq., 35 S. Ct. 712, 59 L. Ed. 1153; Carter v. McClaughry, 1902, 183 U.S. 365, 395, 22 S. Ct. 181, 46 L. Ed. 236; Burton v. United States, supra, 202 U.S. at page 381, 26 S. Ct. at page 698; United States v. Gilboy, supra, 160 F.Supp. at page 442, and see Powe v. United States, 5 Cir., 1926, 11 F.2d 598. In Short v. United States, 4 Cir., 1937, 91 F.2d 614, at pages 620 et seq., 112 A.L.R. 969, the question was held to be one for the jury. In Miller v. United States, 7 Cir., 1925, 4 F.2d 228, at page 230, the question was raised after the evidence was in.
Raff's request for a bill of particulars seeks to obtain the government's evidence and legal theories and is therefore denied. See United States v. Gilboy, supra, 160 F.Supp. at page 442; United States v. Brennan, D.C.D.Minn.1955, 134 F.Supp. 42, at pages 52, 53; United States v. Klein, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1954, 124 F.Supp. 476, at page 479.
As to defendants' motions for discovery and inspection, we reiterate the position taken in United States v. Gilboy, supra, 160 F.Supp. at page 442. Raff's second request calls for government evidence beyond the scope of Rules 16, 17(c); likewise as to his request No. 5, compliance with which would unduly tend to limit the prosecution since Tucker is also under indictment.
Orders in compliance herewith will be filed this date.