back to America as soon as things worked out satisfactorily for her.
Of course, it was convenient and comfortable for her to remain living in the apartment and I have no doubt that her stay could have been considerably shortened without causing her any very great loss, but that does not mean that she had given up her intention to resume her United States residence. The fact that the circumstances which cause a citizen to elect to remain abroad for an extended period fall short of compelling necessity is not conclusive against an intention to return. If the motive for staying away seems trivial and inadequate, it may be strong evidence of the opposite intention, but the conduct of the citizen in other ways may overbalance it. The ultimate question is one of fact which must be resolved, like any other question of fact, not by any fixed formula but by an appraisal of all the evidence in the case.
Miss Willenbrock's consent to the cancellation of her naturalization here is really more strongly indicative of an intention to reside in the United States than the contrary. So far as she knew, it was, for her, as a stateless person, the only way she could get back.
I think it is very important that she at all times refused to accept German nationality. Obviously, to have done so would have made things very much easier for her during the war.
She belonged to no German organizations other than her church. As soon as the war was over, she volunteered her services to the American Red Cross which she served faithfully until her return to the United States. Many decisions interpreting the statute seem to suggest that the courts have considered some degree of adherence to the enemy as a factor. Nothing in this case has cast any doubt upon Miss Willenbrock's continued loyalty to the United States.
My effort to arrive at her intention really sums up to saying that she never wanted to be considered a German citizen or resident, that she desired to be, at all times, an American citizen and to return to the United States to live when it appeared to her to be possible to do so without sacrificing her German property interests.
The defendant challenges the jurisdiction of this court, contending that Miss Willenbrock was not a resident of this district as required by the statute when she instituted the action. The fact is that she had been employed in this district for approximately four years before suit was started except for an eight month period, when she returned to Germany to sell her property. She left for California the day suit was started, after signing the complaint. I conclude that she was a resident of this district when she signed the complaint and that she did not abandon her residence here until she, in fact, left, and that her departure later the same day in no way relates back in time.
The parties have presented elaborate requests for findings of fact which have been very helpful but which it seems unnecessary to answer seriatim, inasmuch as most of them are undisputed. The statements of fact in the foregoing opinion may be taken as my findings of fact and I believe they cover all the material facts necessary to the conclusion reached.
My conclusion of law is that the plaintiff was not 'resident within' Germany after the declaration of war between Germany and the United States or at any time since October 15, 1932, in the sense in which that phrase is interpreted and applied for the purposes of the Trading with the Enemy Act.
I affirm the defendant's first request for a conclusion of law. All the other requests of either party for conclusions of law have, so far as material, been answered in the opinion.
An appropriate order for judgment may be submitted.
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