The evidence by the plaintiff showed that the rubber along the vertical edges of the door leaves was worn. Also other witnesses testified that the rubber and felt on the door was very much worn. Other cases to the same effect are: Hansen v. Henrici's Inc., 319 Ill.App. 458, 49 N.E.2d 737, where the evidence was that the flanges or strips at the bottom of the door were frayed and that there was a space of about an inch between the flanges and the floor; and the flanges on the side of the door were bent and curved; and the door revolved very fast; and that the flanges did not touch the wall about half way up from the floor; Nersiff v. Worcester County Savings and Trust, Inc., 264 Mass. 228, 162 N.E. 349, where there was evidence that the friction strips if used long enough would not come in contact with the sides of the door, and that there were no repairs or readjustments to the friction strips made from 1921 to February 1, 1923, the date of the accident; and Sorenson v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., 238 Mo.App. 1241, 187 S.W.2d 480, where there was testimony that indicated that the air lock strips were 'worn and curled up.'
During the oral discussion on whether the motion for involuntary dismissal should be granted, plaintiff's counsel contended that the court was apparently placing too much reliance on the witness Pitcairn. Plaintiff's counsel indicated that the court was unfamiliar with the rule announced in Johnson v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 3 Cir., 208 F.2d 633, to the effect that a plaintiff is not bound by everything said by each and every witness called. This court understands the rule mentioned. However, the shortage of proof in plaintiff's case is that neither she nor her witnesses could show any defect whatsoever in any of the parts making up the door either the edges of the panels, the padding, weather stripping or any of the parts, including the mechanical speed control. The architect, Mr. Garman, called by the plaintiff, stated that the particular man in this 'county' to whom he would go as a specialist on revolving doors was the witness, James D. Pitcairn.
Mr. Pitcairn testified affirmatively that the revolving door was functioning properly and had no defects in it on February 28, 1952, at the time of his last inspection. Thus, unless negligence can be found from the statement of the plaintiff that as she lay on the floor the door revolved some three, four or five times (it is noted that she was simply giving an estimate and was not sure of the exact number of revolutions), plus the testimony of Mr. Douglas that he saw daylight on one occasion, and plus the statement of the architect Garman that his 'impression' was that a door should only make a half or quarter turn after pressure is released, there is insufficient testimony to go to the jury.
With regard to plaintiff's counsel's contention as to the principle of law that a plaintiff is not bound by what is said by each and every one of her witnesses, the rule to be applied in the instant case is the same as that announced by Judge Goodrich in Warlich v. Miller, 3 Cir., 141 F.2d 168, 170, a diversity case, where he says:
'* * * The plaintiff of course had the burden of proving negligence by the defendant. The Pennsylvania rule is that a plaintiff's case is entitled to go to the jury if his testimony makes out a case sufficient to sustain a verdict in his favor, although the plaintiff introduces further evidence, through another witness, which is conflicting on the issue of defendant's negligence. (Citing cases.)'
It is my view that plaintiff at best has only shown a scintilla of evidence. She simply failed to prove negligence under Pennsylvania law. Taking the combined testimony of herself and her witnesses, there is no indication that the door was not maintained in a reasonably safe and proper manner. There was absolutely no defect shown in the door, nor is there any evidence in plaintiff's case that defendant failed to discharge its legal duty to the plaintiff on the day in question.
As was said in McAdoo v. Autenreith's Dollar Stores, supra, 379 Pa. at page 391, 109 A.2d at page 158, plaintiff presented
'* * * no proof from which defendant's causative negligence could be inferred save for the happening of the accident itself which, of course, is legally insufficient to establish liability. A possessor of land is not an insurer of the safety of an invitee; the standard of conduct required is merely reasonable care * * *.'
This opinion is regarded as comprising the findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with the provisions of Rule 52(a).
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