closely allied, they will be considered together; however, plaintiff's status as a volunteer or otherwise will be reviewed later.
Plaintiff arrived at the site after the pile, with the pipe attached, had been re-connected to the crane boom and raised vertically about twenty feet. Plaintiff did not notice the presence of the pipe when he took his position with his arm around the lower part of the pile to guide its downward course into the partially created hole. Had he observed the pipe, he would have been unable clearly to discern the condition of the rope, the pipe edge, or the manner of the pipe's suspension, since it was twenty feet above him.
Plaintiff was injured while at the location, in the position and performing the function directed by Farquer. He neither knew nor had reason to know that he was being directed into a hazardous position. Farquer was known to the plaintiff as an experienced man in a responsible supervisory post and plaintiff did nothing which was unbidden, proscribed, or beyond his instructions. Under these circumstances the questions of plaintiff's contributory negligence and of assumption of risk were for the jury.
(d) Plaintiff was chargeable with the negligence of a fellow servant.
The availability of the fellow servant doctrine to Levitt as a defense necessarily presupposes that the negligent actor and the injured plaintiff were fellow servants, that is, servants of the same master. This contention is untenable as (e), below, will disclose.
(e) Plaintiff's remedy was limited solely to benefits he was entitled to receive under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act.
This contention cannot prevail unless the plaintiff was an employee of Levitt at the time of his injury. Though Levitt strongly urges that plaintiff was its employee in a master-servant relationship as known at common law, the record is replete with evidence to support a contrary finding. Plaintiff testified that he worked for Roadway. Farquer testified that he borrowed plaintiff from Roadway and had previously supervised plaintiff on a sewer-laying job. Levitt's bookkeeper stated that its records showed no evidence of plaintiff's employment. Finally, there is Levitt's own denial that plaintiff was its employee. This denial was in answer to an interrogatory propounded by Farquer. Levitt's answer was: 'The plaintiff Watson was not an employee of Levitt and Sons, Inc., nor was he on the payroll of Levitt and Sons, Inc. * * * This defendant did not employ Watson, has no records as to his employment or who may have paid his salary. This defendant made no reimbursement to anyone for any salary paid to Watson.' With this positive, sworn statement the jury did not disagree.
Plaintiff was not a causal employee as defined by the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act. Under this statute the employment must be casual in point of frequency and regularity and not in the regular course of the employer's business: Hauger v. H. W. Walker Co., 277 Pa. 506, 121 A. 200. The jury could properly have found that the construction of this dock was in the regular course of Levitt's business as a large-scale developer.
Levitt contends, alternatively, that plaintiff was a loaned or borrowed servant, and as such under the exclusive coverage of the statute. While Farquer testified as to his authority to procure men from Roadway, his contact with Roadway, and the selection of the men he wanted, the jury evidently rejected this testimony and accepted that of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff stated that he was approached for the first time by a subordinate of Farquer about 3:30 P.M. on the afternoon of the accident; that he and other laborers employed by Roadway were putting their tools away after a day's work when Farquer's representative approached and asked if they would mind going over and giving Farquer a hand in putting up piling. The plaintiff thus quoted the intermediary: 'Mr. Farquer is in trouble putting up the piling * * * Will you boys volunteer and come in to help him put it down?' With no knowledge of any details of the dock operation, plaintiff volunteered to help out on the piling referred to, anticipating only a ten or fifteen minute interlude of assistance without compensation.
The plaintiff's testimony negated any employment relationship. If plaintiff, as he testified, went only with the intent to help out temporarily in a difficult situation, unmindful of any assent to employment by Farquer or of remuneration for his service no employment resulted. Harris v. Seiavitch, 336 Pa. 294, 9 A.2d 375.
Pennsylvania has adopted section 332
of the A.L.I. Restatement of Torts: Kimble v. Mackintosch Hemphill Co., 359 Pa. 461, 59 A.2d 68. Comment (a) thereunder explains that there are two classes of business visitors. One of the classes includes persons who are invited or permitted to come upon the land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with the business which the possessor conducts thereon. This class applies to plaintiff with particularity.
That Commonwealth has also adopted section 343
of the Restatement defining the liability of a possessor of land to a business visitor: Ambrose v. Moffat Coal Co., 358 Pa. 465, 58 A.2d 20; Mogren v. Gadonas, 358 Pa. 507, 58 A.2d 150; Engle v. Reider, 366 Pa. 411, 77 A.2d 621; Lanni v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 371 Pa. 106, 88 A.2d 887; Miller v. Hickey, 368 Pa. 317, 81 A.2d 910; Cooper v. Heintz Mfg. Co., 385 Pa. 296, 122 A.2d 699.
This record was adequate to support a finding by the jury that, as respected Levitt, the plaintiff occupied the same position as a business visitor on Levitt's land at the site of the dock construction and was injured as the proximate result of the negligence of Levitt's employee.
Accordingly, this 27 day of December 1956, the motions of Levitt & Sons, Inc. are denied and the judgment in favor of the plaintiff against that defendant is allowed to stand.