1008, affirmed 3 Cir., 1944, 146 F.2d 889.
These records are not conclusive as to the occurrences as testified to by defendant's witnesses and the weight of this evidence was open to attack by competent testimony contradicting them.
The documents are evidence of the terms of the agreement and counsel had ample opportunity to examine and cross-examine all of the witnesses on the resolutions and minutes and on all of the oral testimony concerning the agreement. Plaintiff also had ample opportunity to argue to the jury on the weight of this evidence. The court, therefore, charged the jury that these documents were inconclusive, but specifically instructed them 'to consider it along with the other evidence in arriving at your decision.' (N.T. 146).
From a consideration of all of the testimony and all of the exhibits, the jury concluded that the contract of employment provided that the plaintiff could be discharged at any time in the discretion of the Board of Directors.
Thus, in making its decision, the jury had before it all offered relevant evidence and its finding may not be disturbed.
3. Testimony that the defendant corporation made contracts since its incorporation in April 1934 with all of 'about seven men' who have ever served as officers of the company, on a certain basis,
is admissible as tending to prove a practice of the defendant company not to make written contracts or contracts for definite periods of time with its various officers. Baldridge v. Matthews, 1954, 378 Pa. 566, 569, 570, 106 A.2d 809, 811.
See, also, 1 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.) § 92 et seq., where it is stated that:
'Whether or not sufficient regularity exists must depend largely on the circumstances of each case.'
Here the testimony that the defendant had not employed and of the seven officers of the corporation since its incorporation for a stated term establishes such a sufficient regularity.
The court, in considering the admissibility of this testimony, clearly referred to it as evidence of practice and never alluded to it as conclusive or binding evidence. Also, it should be noted that plaintiff's attorney did not raise this objection at the end of the court's charge, although ample opportunity was allowed him when the court requested suggested additions to the charge before the jury was sent out to deliberate.
4. There is no error in the court's having admitted into evidence the testimony of W. R. Helfrich
that the testimony of his father, P. D. Helfrich, a preceding defense witness, concerning a meeting between plaintiff and the two Helfrichs in the Benjamin Franklin Hotel some day in the month of March 1952, was correct.
In permitting the restriction of direct examination of the witness to a mere corroboration of a previous witness' statement, the court was in its sound discretion excluding cumulative testimony by defense witnesses. See 6 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.) §§ 1907 & 1908; Ries v. Ries' Estate, 1936, 322 Pa. 211, 220, 221, 185 F. 288; and District of Columbia v. Leys, 1933, 62 App.D.C. 3, 63 F.2d 646.
See, also, 4 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.) §§ 1230 & 1244, stating that summaries of voluminous documents are acceptable in evidence in the discretion of the hearing judge.
Further, plaintiff's counsel had ample opportunity on cross-examination to have the witness fully relate the events of the meeting and he made no attempt to do so. This failure on his part waives his right to now object to the court's ruling.
5. There is no merit in any of the other reasons for new trial raised by plaintiff which have been carefully considered.