The opinion of the court was delivered by: DUSEN
This case comes before the court on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and on defendants' motion for entry of judgment in their favor made at the conclusion of the hearing held on the motion for preliminary injunction.
The hearing judge's conclusion that the defendants are entitled to the entry of judgment in their favor, on the basis of the entire record, makes it unnecessary to consider the motion
for dismissal of the action made by defendants at the conclusion of plaintiff's case.
'(a). The work in general consists of increasing the electrical service capacity, providing metering facilities and correct wiring defects to meet the requirements of the Philadelphia Electric Company and all local and national codes and regulations.
'4. Installation Requirements
'Install raceways, cables, wires, supports, switches, meter sockets, etc. as required and indicated on drawings, supplying such auxillary equipment and materials necessary to complete the installation to meet the requirements of the Philadelphia Electric Company and Local and National Codes.'
The first sentence of paragraph 11 of the General Provisions of the Contract (see Exhibits P-7 and P-3) provides:
'The Contractor shall, without additional expense to the Government, obtain all licenses and permits required for the prosecution of the work.'
Bristol Terrace I is a permanent housing project, was completed in 1942 or 1943 under the Lanham Act of October 14, 1940,
54 Stat. 1125, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1521 ff. as a war housing project
and is situated on approximately 35 acres of land in Bristol Township. It was being operated by the plaintiff in 1956 when the decision was made to take active steps to dispose of this property.
After competitive bids were received for the electric work described above, a contract dated June 25, 1956, was entered into with John Harold Bronson, trading as The Bronson Electric Company.
Bronson started work in July and on August 3, 1956, his foreman was instructed by the Bristol Township Building Official to terminate the electric work in accordance with a stop work order issued under Section 305 of the Bristol Township Building Code (Exhibit D-4A), which was posted at the job site and a copy of which was sent by registered mail to, and received by, Bronson. The next week the above-mentioned Building Official explained to Bronson on the phone that building permits for each of the 200 buildings to which repairs were to be made could be secured for $ 1.15 per building, or a total of $ 230. Bronson failed to apply for such permits and, on August 10, 1956, the Building Official had the Justice of the Peace issue 67 warrants charging Bronson with violation of Sections 309 and 309a of the Building Code
(see Exhibits D-5
and D-6) in connection with 67 units on which he had been working. On August 16 Bronson appeared for a hearing and entered a plea of guilty. The Justice of the Peace imposed a fine and costs (under Section 1301 of the Code) in the total amount of $ 2445.50. Bronson has filed no appeal (Cf. 19 P.S. § 1189).
The hearing judge adopts the foregoing as Findings of Fact.
The basic legal issue in this case is: may a contractor doing work for the Federal Government disregard building code legislation enacted by a local community under the police power, where the work to be done under the contract is solely for the purpose of facilitating the sale by the Federal Government of its property to private citizens?
The United States Supreme Court has held that, unless Congress provides to the contrary, a contractor who erects a Government post office 'does not share any governmental immunity' and is subject to 'provisions as to types of material, fire hazards and the like, which are covered by the New York City Building Code.' See James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 1940, 309 U.S. 94, 105, 60 S. Ct. 431, 436, 84 L. Ed. 596. It has been repeatedly held that a state may impose a nondiscriminatory tax on the activities of a contractor for the Federal Government.
Also, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that even employees of federal corporations acting as agencies of the United States (such as plaintiff) are not immune from reasonable state legislation. See Graves v. People of State of New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 1939, 306 U.S. 466, 59 S. Ct. 595, 83 L. Ed. 927. However, the Government contends that the Lanham Act is inconsistent with the above-mentioned sections of the Bristol Township Building Code.
In applying the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, clause 2, the task of a court is to determine whether the state or local police power regulation (in this case, the requirement of the Bristol Township Building Code that permits be secured prior to the making of electrical repairs)
is compatible with the policy expressed in the federal statutes and in the Federal Constitution. An examination of the Lanham Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1521-1590, indicates to the hearing judge that Congress expressed no intent to exempt a contractor doing electrical work, in order to enable the sale of such housing units to private citizens, from a local building code requirement designed to protect the public safety.
In fact, Congress expressed its intent that projects constructed under this Act 'shall, so far as may be practicable, conform in location and design to local planning and tradition,' 42 U.S.C.A. § 1545 and that Government ownership of the project shall not 'deprive any State or political subdivision thereof, including any Territory or possession of the United States, of its civil and criminal jurisdiction in and over such property, or impair the civil rights under the State or local law of the inhabitants on such property.' 42 U.S.C.A. § 1547.
The Act recognizes that local governments will furnish services to projects such as Bristol Terrace I for which Congress provided compensation should be made.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress, in enacting legislation within its constitutional authority, will not be deemed to have intended to invalidate state or local rules for protection of the public safety unless its purpose to do so is clearly stated. Southern Pacific Co. v. State of Arizona, 1945, 325 U.S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed. 1915; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 1947, 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 91 L. Ed. 1447; International Union, U.A.W.A.F. of L., Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations ...