The test is whether in law and in fact the petition should be granted, the privilege postponed or barred forever. Each case stands upon its own facts.
Yuen Jung v. Barber, supra, 184 F.2d at page 495, suggests that finding prior conduct per se sufficient to preclude citizenship requires a holding '* * * that Congress had enacted a legislative doctrine of predestination and eternal damnation'; that 'All modern legislation dealing with crime and punishment proceeds upon the theory that aside from capital cases, no man is beyond redemption. We think a like principle underlies these provisions for naturalization.' (Italics supplied.) But see In re Ross, supra, 188 F. at page 686, '* * * if his personal welfare alone was entitled to consideration the conferring * * * rights of citizenship might be considered as proper aid and encouragement. This matter, * * * is not to be determined along such narrow lines. * * *' In re Caroni, supra, 13 F.2d at page 955, '* * * Undoubtedly the interest of society requires the rehabilitation of the criminal * * * but this does not import * * * (bestowal) * * * of * * * citizenship.' The liberality shown in the cases in Note 8 supra was as to the offense or conduct which would not preclude awarding citizenship and in allowing reapplication albeit not until five years later.
The view we take more nearly comports with and effectuates the purpose of the naturalization statutes. The contrary view is at variance with the purpose of the statute, nullifies to a certain extent at least, the rule that any doubt must be resolved against the petitioner. See 22 A.L.R.2d at 247; and see Petition of Reginelli, 20 N.J. 266, 119 A.2d 454, at page 456, 'We prefer to embrace these latter adjudications as establishing a rule more workable and practical, conducive of sounder and more realistic justice, particularly where, as here, the past may by logical inference illuminate some presently occurring development.'
The question is what did Congress intend. In our view the best expression of that intention is indicated by the holding of Marcantonio v. United States, supra. We find additional support for this view in § 316(a)(e) of the 1952 Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1427(a, e), 'In determining whether the petitioner has sustained the burden of establishing good moral character and the other qualifications for citizenship specified in subsection (a) of this section, the court shall not be limited to the petitioner's conduct during the five years preceding the filing of the petition, but may take into consideration as a basis for such determination the petitioner's conduct and acts at any time prior to that period.' See Commentary, 8 U.S.C.A. p. 79.
And see Id. § 101(f), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(f),
'For the purposes of this chapter --
'No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be established, is, or was -- * * *
'(8) one who at any time has been convicted of the crime of murder * * *' See Legislative History 1952, United States Code, Congressional and Administrative News, Volume 2, p. 1739. Also see In re De Angelis, D.C.E.D.N.Y.1956, 139 F.Supp. 779.
Certainly in the 1952 Act Congress expressed its intention, i. e., that a man who committed murder should not become a citizen of the United States. With the light suggested by that unequivocal declaration of congressional intent and by the teachings of the Supreme Court, we hold that in view of the petitioner's conviction of murder and incidentally the fact that he was on parole during a part of the five-year period, the petitioner has not shown good moral character during the prescribed statutory period. The petition will therefore be denied.