brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.'
'(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.'
The complaint has been amended to allege that the plaintiff, an Indiana corporation, has an office and does business in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Commission contends that the venue of the action is improper, even though the plaintiff is doing business in this district.
In support of this contention, the Commission relies upon the case of Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Davenport, D.C.S.D.Iowa 1950, 94 F.Supp. 83, 84, in which the court held that the language used, Sec. 1391(c), supra, "* * * and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes" applies only to a defendant corporation and not to a plaintiff corporation. It also cites the case of United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc., v. United States, D.C.M.D.Ga.1954, 123 F.Supp. 435. However, in that case the court found it unnecessary to decide whether Sec. 1391(c) permitted a corporation to sue as a plaintiff.
On the other hand, plaintiff cites the case of Freiday v. Cowdin, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1949, 83 F.Supp. 516, appeal dismissed 2 Cir., 1949, 177 F.2d 1020. There the court held that the above quoted clause of Sec. 1391(c) makes it proper to lay venue in the district where a plaintiff corporation is doing business as well as a defendant corporation.
The Freiday case, supra, was cited with approval in Hadden v. Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co., D.C.N.D.Ohio 1952, 105 F.Supp. 530 at page 531, where the court said:
'This Court finds itself in accord with the result reached in Freiday v. Cowdin, supra. It would be purposeless to engage in a lengthy discussion of semantics or to belabor unreasonably the meaning of words. It is sufficient to say that, had the framers of the statute intended to confine venue to defendant corporations, the language 'and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes' would be meaningless and redundant in the face of the clear, expressive and unambiguous wording which precedes it. If any other result was intended, the remedy lies in legislative amendment, rather than in faulty judicial construction.'
This position was upheld in the recent case of Southern Paperboard Corporation v. United States, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1955, 127 F.Supp. 649, at page 650, where the court said:
'I therefore conclude that under section 1391(c) a district where a corporation is licensed to do business or is doing business is the proper venue for an action brought by the corporation as well as for an action brought against the corporation. * * *'
We adopt this view and hold that the plaintiff corporation is doing business in this district, is a 'resident' for the purposes of venue and the action was properly instituted here.
However, the Commission further argues it is not incorporated and, therefore, is not within the provisions of section (c).
However, in the Hunkin-Conkey case, supra, the court said, 34 F.Supp. at page 28:
'The fact that the Commission is not a corporation does not make it any less a distinct legal entity. It is an unincorporated association, sometimes called a quasi corporation, with power to sue and be sued in its own name * * *.'
Venue provisions of the Code have been extended to suits against partnerships and unincorporated associations. Darby v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., D.C.E.D.Pa.1947, 73 F.Supp. 522. As was stated by Judge Hand in Sperry Products v. Association of American Railroads, 2 Cir., 1942, 132 F.2d 408, at pages 411-412, 145 A.L.R. 694:
'* * * Thus, for most purposes the law still looks at such associations as mere aggregations of individuals. Since, however, for the purpose of suit it has come to regard them as jural entities, we can see no reason why that doctrine should not be applied consistently to other procedural incidents than service of process, and venue is one of such incidents. Certainly that promotes simplicity, and simplicity was one of the conveniences which induced the original change. * * *
'* * * It does not violate common understanding to think of a common venture or enterprise as having spatial position wherever any part of those activities take place by which it is realized. That is a practicable test and it is really the only practicable test. To say that it exists wherever any of its members are is plainly untenable, for they all have their individual activities which are altogether alien to the enterprise. To say that the enterprise prise exists wherever and whenever any of the members think about it would be childish. There remains, so far as we can see, only what we have suggested; and we hold that the defendant Association was present wherever any substantial part of its activities were continuously carried on. * * * (Emphasis supplied.)
'* * * If so, the same test must apply to an unincorporated association with the added limitation that as to it no state of incorporation exists to disturb the test in application. For these reasons we think that if a patentee chooses to sue an unincorporated association under the doctrine of United Mine Workers (of America) v. Coronado Coal Co., supra, 259 U.S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570, 66 L. Ed. 975, 27 A.L.R. 762, he must do so either at its principal place of business, or at any of the regular and established places of its business where it may have infringed.'