our view, unimportant in the determination of this question.
In the cross-examination of this witness, counsel for defendant, after establishing that one of the interviews occurred on May 5, 1954, proceeded to ask the witness if he remembered that certain questions and answers had been asked and given. But before the witness could answer the question, counsel posed another as to whether the witness remembered that another quoted question had been asked of the defendant. Again, before the witness could answer, Mr. Kossman continued by stating that he would read the defendant's answer to the question; he represented that he was reading from a 'transcript of testimony'. At that point there was an objection by the Assistant United States Attorney which was sustained.
Immediately following this colloquy counsel for defendant again attempted to ask the witness if he remembered that a certain quoted question was asked of the defendant during the interview. Before any answer by the witness, the court reminded defense counsel of its prior ruling.
After establishing that Yaskin himself had asked the defendant various questions, counsel for defendant again asked the witness if he remembered asking the defendant a question, but before counsel could state the exact question, the court again reminded counsel of its prior ruling.
These are the rulings which defendant assails as a prejudicial limitation on his right of cross-examination and which he asserts entitle him to new trial.
Viewed by themselves, the rulings might lead to a conclusion that defendant is on firm ground in his request, but as is so often the case an examination of what preceded and succeeded these occurrences is necessary to the final determination of the question.
To begin with, in nineteen instances defendant's counsel was permitted without objection to elicit from the witness Rice self-serving utterances of the defendant. Again in the examination of the witness Johnson, counsel for defendant drew out on eleven occasions evidence of declarations of the same nature apparently made during the course of the various interviews. Following the rulings complained of, counsel in cross-examining Yaskin about the interviews, on some nine occasions obtained from the witness testimony of other self-serving declarations of the defendant and completed his examination by asking the witness a question, without interference, in the very form which had been previously curtailed. It is apparent that broad latitude was allowed the defendant in developing fully the interviews whence came the admissions.
Defendant cannot complain that he was in the broad sense limited in any attempt to impeach the witness or test his testimonial qualifications. The statements of the court (Transcript of Record, p. 305) gave the defendant full license to impeach in any proper manner he desired.
In short, it appears that the defendant's counsel attempted to read to the jury certain questions and answers from an unidentified transcript
under the guise of testing Yaskin's recollection. Although the court refused to permit this, the defendant appears to have achieved his objective. For, during the course of the cross-examination of various government witnesses, many of these same questions and answers were brought out. Viewing the court's ruling in its proper context, the only complaint that the defendant can legitimately have is that he was prevented from using this unidentified transcript precisely when and how he chose. That he was not prejudiced by the court's ruling is further buttressed by the fact that he made no effort to properly identify the transcript for employment in his cross-examination of Yaskin, nor did he make any effort to use the transcript in his case-in chief. Accordingly, this point must also be decided against the defendant.