The opinion of the court was delivered by: MILLER
This case is before the court upon (1) defendant's motion to strike portions of the complaint, (2) defendant's motion for more definite statement, (3) defendant's motion to dismiss, (4) defendant's objection to request for admissions, (5) defendant's objection to interrogatories, and (6) plaintiff's motion for a protective order against defendant's taking plaintiff's deposition.
The court's jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy. The complaint was filed October 30, 1954. The following facts appear from the complaint, as amended. Plaintiff smoked defendant's Chesterfield cigarettes from 1921 until December 1953. Defendant maliciously, wantonly, fraudulently, and deceitfully represented to the public, including plaintiff, that, inter alia, the use of defendant's cigarettes was not harmful to health. Defendant intended such representations to be acted upon. Defendant negligently manufactured cigarettes containing harmful ingredients which made the cigarettes dangerous for human consumption. Smoking defendant's cigarettes caused plaintiff a carcinoma of the right lung and other injuries and damages. Actual damages and exemplary and punitive damages are demanded. In a second count, many of the foregoing allegations are incorporated, and it is further alleged that defendant warranted that its cigarettes were free from any injurious substances and were wholesome, suitable and fit for use and consumption by the general public, including plaintiff. Other alleged warranties relating to the healthfulness of smoking defendant's cigarettes are averred. However, defendant's cigarettes contained, and defendant knew they contained, harmful ingredients, wherefore plaintiff suffered the injuries mentioned above. Plaintiff smoked defendant's cigarettes, induced by defendant's warranties and relying upon defendant's skill and judgment. Plaintiff gave written notice of the breach of warranty to defendant prior to filing the complaint.
The first four paragraphs of an the amendment to the motion to strike seek to strike from the complaint all references to the general public. The averments of the complaint do not indicate that plaintiff's claim lies in the fact that the alleged representations were made to the public. Rather, it appears that the references to the general public were included to show in what manner representations were made to plaintiff, i.e. as a member of the general public. Defendant is not harmed by plaintiff's pleading the facts upon which he relies with greater than the minimum amount of detail required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. The allegations are not clearly impertinent, scandalous, immaterial, or redundant. See Gas Consumers Ass'n v. Philadelphia Gas Works Co., D.C.E.D.Pa.1951, 12 F.R.D. 125, 127; 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 367 pp. 737-42 (Rules ed. 1950).
By the fifth paragraph of the motion to strike, defendant seeks to strike the claim for punitive damages in the second count of the complaint. Plaintiff has conceded the merits of this contention, and a stipulation has been filed withdrawing plaintiff's claim for punitive damages in the second count of the complaint.
Defendant's motion to strike will be denied.
2. Motion for more definite statement.
The first paragraph of defendant's motion for more definite statement seeks to require a more definite statement with respect to the state in which plaintiff claims citizenship. Plaintiff has fulfilled this requirement by amending his complaint.
The second paragraph of the motion seeks to require plaintiff to plead the date on which he gave written notice of breach of warranty and the date when he first learned of such breach. The third paragraph of the motion seeks to require plaintiff to plead the date when he first learned that he had developed a carcinoma of the right lung. The fourth paragraph seeks to require plaintiff to plead the date when plaintiff stopped smoking Chesterfields, it appearing from the fourth paragraph of the complaint that plaintiff smoked Chesterfields 'until December 1953', but also that 'retailers * * * sell said cigarettes to the general public, including plaintiff.' (Emphasis supplied.)
The information sought by the third paragraph of the motion may or may not determine when plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged breach of warranty. It is clearly a subsidiary fact which should not be required to be pleaded.
The information sought by the fourth paragraph of the motion may also be relevant to the question of reasonable notice, but it would also establish the terminal date of the sales which form the basis for this action. The court need not determine whether such information would be required to be pleaded because, from a fair and reasonable reading of the fourth paragraph of the complaint, it has been pleaded that plaintiff stopped smoking Chesterfields in December 1953. True, the latter portion of the fourth paragraph, literally construed, indicates that plaintiff was buying Chesterfields ten months later when the complaint was filed. It is clear, however, that any sales of Chesterfields to plaintiff after plaintiff stopped smoking them are not among the sales which form the basis for this action.
Likewise, with respect to the fifth paragraph of defendant's motion, plaintiff will not be required to plead whether the word 'dyspepsia' in his complaint means 'dyspnea.' The possibility of a typographical error having been pointed out to plaintiff, upon plaintiff's failure to amend the pertinent portion of his complaint, it can only be presumed that plaintiff meant what he pleaded.
The second paragraph of the motion seeks to require plaintiff to plead the facts which would show how long after knowledge of breach of warranty notice thereof was given. The complaint avers that written notice was given prior to the filing of the complaint, but it is silent as to when plaintiff knew or should have known of the breach of warranty, and there is no averment that notice was given within a reasonable time thereafter.
Defendant does not ask that plaintiff be required merely to plead the conclusion that notice was given within a reasonable time after he knew or should have known of the alleged breach of warranty, and the court is unable to perceive any purpose in requiring such an averment. The fact that such an averment would be a conclusion would not necessarily be objectionable. As stated in 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, supra, at § 367 p. 737, 'the rules do not condemn conclusions of law but encourage them as at times the clearest and simplest way of stating a claim for relief,' pointing out, at n. 30, that 'the approved forms are replete with conclusions of law.' Moreover, the relevant date is the date when plaintiff knew or should have known of the breach of warranty, and that date is itself a conclusion to be determined by many subsidiary facts. Defendant does not, of course, contend that plaintiff must plead all of the evidentiary facts which are needed in order to determine ...