Mrs. Marks yelled for her husband. The intruder then slammed the door shut, dived out of the window, which he had originally entered, on to the shed roof and jumped from there to the ground. When Garrison was apprehended some hours later by friends and neighbors of the Marks family who were searching for him, and returned to the house, he was positively identified by Mrs. Marks. Such identification was repeated at the trial. When the police officers took him into custody he had a slight injury to his ankle and was limping. The Commonwealth's contention was that he injured his ankle in his precipitous exit from the second floor of the house. Garrison, for the first time at the trial, contended that his ankle was injured when he was being apprehended. There was, however, ample credible testimony to the contrary.
Garrison now repeats his allegation of illegal detention and contends that it must follow that his trial and conviction are void. While, if it were material, the facts would be adjudged adversely to him,
nevertheless jurisdiction of the State Court would not have been affected thereby even if there had been undue force by the civilians, as he contends, or for that matter even though it had been by officers of the law, Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S. Ct. 509, 96 L. Ed. 541.
Nor does it constitute a proper subject of habeas corpus.
Garrison repeats his contention that there was no evidence to support the crime of burglary. There was ample evidence to sustain the verdict and the credibility of the witnesses was for the jury.
Nor is the sufficiency of the evidence a proper subject of habeas corpus except where there is an entire lack of evidence.
Garrison objects to the fact that the trial court commented on the evidence. The court fully instructed the jury that their recollection of the evidence controlled. There would be no error in this respect even had this trial been in a Federal Court and no constitutional question is involved.
In any event, this is not a matter on which habeas corpus would lie.
The question of what constitutes intent for the commission of the crime of burglary, which question Garrison seeks to raise here, is a matter within the province of the State court and was given full consideration by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
This question is not before this Court since it involves no Constitutional rights. Even if error had existed, which we do not mean to infer, the rule is that habeas corpus does not lie to correct mere errors of law in a trial.
As this Court stated in United States ex rel. Borday v. Claudy, D.C.M.D.Pa., 108 F.Supp. 778, 780:
'Federal Courts must withhold interference with the administration of State criminal justice unless, as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), a prisoner is in custody in violation of the Constitution, Laws or Treaties of the United States. There is no such basis for the issuance of a writ in this case, and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the rule issued thereon discharged.'