to accept, on its behalf, service of process in any action arising out of acts or omissions of such corporation within this Commonwealth.'
Subsection C of that Act provides:
'C. For the purposes of this act, the entry of any corporation into this Commonwealth for the doing of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing a single act in this Commonwealth for such purpose with the intention of thereby initiating a series of such acts, shall constitute 'doing business'.'
Prior to the enactment of this statute, it is clear that defendant could not be considered as doing business in Pennsylvania. See the Partin case, supra; Pellegrini v. Roux Distributing Co., 1951, 170 Pa.Super. 68, 84 A.2d 222; Lutz v. Foster & Kester Co., 1951, 367 Pa. 125, 79 A.2d 222. Insofar as we can determine, there has been no judicial application of Subsection C, but since, in a diversity action, this court sits as another Pennsylvania court, Angel v. Bullington, 1947, 330 U.S. 183, 67 S. Ct. 657, 91 L. Ed. 832, we must do our best to interpret the statute as we believe the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would interpret it. It is our judgment that the statute is a plain expression of the State's power to declare what is 'doing business' in Pennsylvania; that power is extended by the statute to include the entry of a corporation into Pennsylvania 'for the doing of a series of similar acts' designed to produce 'pecuniary benefit' or 'otherwise accomplishing an object'. The defendant admits that eight of its agents were regularly employed in Pennsylvania, and one of them in the Pittsburgh district, for the purpose of promoting the business of the defendant, building good-will and encouraging the sale of its magazine. Thus the corporation cannot successfully deny that it made entries by its agents into Pennsylvania in order to accomplish the purposes expressed in Subsection C.
It is our opinion that under the statute above quoted and the circumstances derived from the complaint and answers to the interrogatories, this defendant foreign corporation can properly be brought before the Pennsylvania courts.
In respect to the second question: It appears that the door to state judicial jurisdiction has been opened fairly wide in recent years. See: Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 1952, 342 U.S. 437, 72 S. Ct. 413, 96 L. Ed. 485; Travelers Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 1950, 339 U.S. 643, 70 S. Ct. 927, 94 L. Ed. 1154; International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 1945, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 159, 90 L. Ed. 95. On the question of due process of law, in the International Shoe Co. case, supra, it was pointed out that the demands of due process may be met by such contacts of the corporation within the state of the forum as to make it reasonable to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there; and that 'Presence' in the state in which the suit is brought, in this sense, has never been doubted where 'the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liability sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given.' See Woodworkers Tool Works v. Byrne, 9 Cir., 1951, 191 F.2d 667; Hill v. United States, 10 Cir., 1951, 186 F.2d 669; Clements v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., D.C.E.D.Tex.1939, 28 F.Supp. 274.
As we see it, the activities of the defendant's agents in encouraging and promoting the sale or defendant's magazines in Pennsylvania, one of which contains the pictures of plaintiffs allegedly causing them damage, makes it reasonable to require the corporation to defend the suit in Pennsylvania. In our opinion the prosecution of this action in Pennsylvania does not violate the concept of due process. Accordingly, an order will be entered denying the defendant's motion to dismiss.