been deprived of civil rights under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage in State or Territory.
There is no suggestion in count one of the complaint that Levitt in refusing to sell houses to the plaintiffs was acting under color of any state authority. On the contrary it is alleged that it acted 'arbitrarily, wilfully and maliciously' and in counts three and four (now withdrawn) it was charged with acting in violation of the common and statutory law of Pennsylvania and its public policy.
The theory on which count two appears to be drawn, namely, that because Levitt is subject to the control and supervision of various officials and agencies of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in constructing streets, schools, sewage and water systems, etc., it is in effect a municipality and a branch of the government of Pennsylvania, is too far-fetched to require discussion.
If the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked upon any other ground such as the existence of the federal question, the jurisdictional amount must appear, and as pointed out in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 508, 59 S. Ct. 954, 960, 83 L. Ed. 1423, if challenged by a motion like the present one it must be substantiated by 'proof on the part of the plaintiff of facts justifying the conclusion that the suit involves the necessary sum.' There is in the present case not only no proof but there are no facts pleaded justifying that conclusion, and the bare allegation of the amount involved is insufficient.
The matter in controversy here is not title to a house, neither the legal title nor the equitable title involved in a suit for specific performance. What is in controversy is the privilege or right, claimed by the plaintiffs, to have the seller accept their offer to buy a house on the seller's terms -- a transaction which may or may not turn out to be profitable to the plaintiffs. 'The pecuniary consequences to the individual party, dependent on the litigation, and 'not the principle involved' is the matter in dispute'. Dewar v. Brooks, D.C., 16 F.Supp. 636, 640; Wheless v. City of St. Louis, 180 U.S. 379, 382, 21 S. Ct. 402, 45 L. Ed. 583. Thus in the present case the plaintiffs are bound to prove, or at least plead, facts from which the Court can conclude that it will profit them to the extent of $ 3,000 each to be able to purchase a house in Levittown at the price at which houses are offered. This they have not done and consequently the jurisdiction of this Court is lacking.
The complaint may be dismissed.
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