I am satisfied that that section of the Criminal Code, which penalizes conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, embraces the right of a voter in a congressional election to have his vote honestly counted, and is violated by a conspiracy of election officials to injure citizens of the United States in the free exercise and enjoyment of their right to vote for legally qualified persons for the office of United States Senator and United States Representative. United States v. Saylor, 332 U.S. 385, 64 S. Ct. 1101, 88 L. Ed. 1341; Crolich v. United States, 5 Cir., 196 F.2d 879.
The free and untrammeled election of public officials is a sacred trust which must forever remain unimpinged and unsullied.
At no time in our national existence have we owed a greater responsibility to more jealously and zealously guard the freedom of our elections -- either from those who would subvert them in the mad frenzy for power, or those who would compromise and besmirch their meaning by fraudulent and illegal conduct at the polls.
In the long run, one can prove just as dangerous and inimical to free democratic instructions as the other.
I feel that an uncompromising adherence to these basic precepts together with a fair and undeviating application of the law is essential to a just and proper determination of the issues herein posed.
In some of the cases herein included, it is complained that not all the alleged co-conspirators were named as defendants. The law appears to be well settled that all conspirators need not be joined in a single indictment. United States v. Heitler, 7 Cir., 274 F. 401. In fact, the charge of conspiracy among defendants and divers persons unknown does not collapse with acquittal of all except one defendant. Pomerantz v. United States, 3 Cir., 51 F.2d 911.
I must conclude, therefore, that the requisites of Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have been fully satisfied in that the 'essential facts constituting the offense charged' are stated, 18 U.S.C.A. Rule 7(c), and the offense charged is within the terms and provisions of the statute invoked.
Motion for Bill of Particulars.
A motion for a bill of particulars, in a criminal proceeding, is addressed to the trial court's discretion. Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 47 S. Ct. 300, 71 L. Ed. 545; United States v. Mesarosh, D.C., 13 F.R.D. 180.
Upon a review of the specific counts, it is my judgment that they speak with sufficient particularity to apprise the defendant of the crime charged to enable him to properly prepare his defense.
The government is not required to furnish the defendant in advance with the government's evidence. Mulloney v. United States, 1 Cir., 79 F.2d 566. Nor is an indictment required to set forth a myriad of details or satisfy every objection which human ingenuity may devise. It is sufficient if it charges every substantial element of the offense, and at the same time apprises the accused of the charge against him in such a manner that he can prepare his defense without being taken by surprise, and to inform the court of the charges so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction. Woolley v. United States, 9 Cir., 97 F.2d 258; United States v. Shindler, D.C., 13 F.R.D. 292; United States v. Krepper, 3 Cir., 159 F.2d 958.
For the reasons stated, defendants' motions to dismiss the indictments and/or suppress the evidence, and for bill of particulars will be refused.
An appropriate Order is entered.
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