The opinion of the court was delivered by: MARSH
This is an action for damages for the death of Thomas M. DeHass, alleged to have been caused by negligence of the defendant. The decedent's domicile was in Pennsylvania; his widow and children and the defendant are all citizens of that state. The plaintiff is a citizen of Ohio and has been duly appointed administrator of the estate. Diversity of citizenship is the sole basis for jurisdiction of this court.
The defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, attacking the court's jurisdiction, in which he contends
(a) The real parties in interest in this action are all citizens of Pennsylvania and the appointment of a citizen of Ohio as administrator was a collusive attempt to confer jurisdiction on this court in violation of Section 1339 of Title 28 U.S.C.A.; and
(b) The bringing of the action in this court is in violation of Rule 213(e) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
With regard to defendant's contention (a), that there is no diversity of citizenship between the real parties in interest and that the appointment of plaintiff was collusive, the same argument was made in Jaffe v. Philadelphia & W.R. Co., 3 Cir., 1950, 180 F.2d 1010, and there decided adversely to the defendant. On that authority we likewise decide against the defendant here.
Defendant relies on Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 213(e), 12 P.S.Appendix, which provides:
'A cause of action for the wrongful death of a decedent and a cause of action for his injuries which survives his death may be enforced in one action but if independent actions are commenced they shall be consolidated for trial.
'(1) If independent actions are commenced or are pending in the same court, the court, on its own motion or the motion of any party, shall order the actions consolidated for trial.
'(2) If independent actions are commenced in different courts, the court in which the second action was commenced, on its own motion or the motion of any party, shall order the action transferred to the court in which the first action was commenced.
'(3) If an action is commenced to enforce one cause of action, the court, on its own motion or the motion of any party, may stay the action until an action is commenced to enforce the other cause of action and is consolidated therewith or until the commencement of such second action is barred by the applicable statute of limitation.'
This rule was promulgated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania following the decision in Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 1942, 344 Pa. 643, 26 A.2d 659, 662, in which the court cautioned against the duplication of damages and required consolidation 'whenever two actions are brought by the personal representative of the deceased'.
Hopkins v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., D.C.E.D.Pa.1953, 112 F.Supp. 136, was an action brought under the Survival Act, 20 P.S.Pa. Chapter 3 Appendix, §§ 771, 772, by an administratrix in the district court after suit under the Wrongful Death Act, 12 P.S.Pa. §§ 1602, 1603, had been instituted in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action in the district court on the ground that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 213(e) required that the actions be consolidated for trial. The motion was dismissed on the theory that the rule is not binding upon federal courts.
In the instant case we have the further complication of two actions filed under the Survival Act. However, the pendency of an action in a state court is no bar to an action concerning the same matter in a federal court. The state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over certain controversies which arise between citizens of different states. Each may proceed independently to determine the issues before it, and the first case to terminate in a judgment becomes res judicata as to the other. Therefore, the fact that the plaintiff has a similar suit pending in Lawrence County is not ...