deceived the Local Board by not notifying it of the change of his circumstances- the miscarriage.
It appears that probably the registrant realized that if he had notified the Local Board of the miscarriage he would have been put into class 1A immediately and, therefore, he withheld this information. It appears that the registrant probably realized, also, that if he had notified the Board that his wife was pregnant again within two months of the miscarriage the Local Board might have treated the new pregnancy as an effort to escape induction and in its discretion would have refused a reclassification to 3A based on the new pregnancy.
Obviously the registrant has not been entirely honorable in his dealings with his Local Board. Because of his actions the entire Selective Service System, from the Local Board to the State Director, is firm in its position that the registrant must now be inducted. In their stand, under these circumstances, no court, particularly a court of equity, should overrule them. Plaintiff is in a court of equity when he asks for a restraining order and an injunction. He is in a court of law when he asks for a Declaratory Judgment, but in my opinion equitable principles should be applied in this legal (as contrasted with the equity action) declaratory judgment proceeding.
Also, as a matter of justice and equity, this court should not grant the plaintiff relief, since he did not act to protect himself by taking the before-mentioned steps which were available to him within the Selective Service System. It should be noticed that if the registrant had been entirely forthright with the Local Board and had notified it of the miscarriage, immediately after it occurred, he might have been inducted long ago. By failing to notify the Board of the miscarriage he has obtained for himself a postponement of induction of almost a year. By this postponement he has caused some other registrant (later in line) to take his place in the military service.
This may seem like a harsh result since other fathers are not being inducted at this time, and I have no way of determining with certainty whether this registrant (the plaintiff) acted deliberately or merely ignorantly.
It is certain, however, that he was dilatory. The Selective Service officials are of the opinion that in their discretion no relief should be given to him. In my opinion, under the circumstances of the present case, a court should not overrule them in their considered decision. It is clear from the many court cases that courts are extremely reluctant to inject themselves into Selective Service problems. Certainly in this case a court should not do it.
The government has argued that a registrant under the Selective Service Act cannot attack in court actions of the Selective Service officials until he has reported for induction, and that since the registrant in this case has not yet reported for induction the present action is premature. Since I am deciding the case against the plaintiff for other reasons it is not necessary for me to decide the question raised by this contention of the government. The question has come up in Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 64 S. Ct. 346, 88 L. Ed. 305 and Gibson v. United States, 329 U.S. 338, 67 S. Ct. 301, 91 L. Ed. 331.
It is ordered as follows: (1) The restraining order is dissolved, (2) The requested injunction is refused, (3) The action requesting a restraining order is dismissed, (4) The action requesting an injunction is dismissed, (5) It is adjudged in the declaratory judgment action that the plaintiff is not entitled to be classified in class 3A.