of personal property and the rents of real estate which may probably come into the guardian's hands, and the source from which the money is to be obtained is Proceeds of Insurance- Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. at $ 30.09 per mo. until $ 7,302.47 is paid and $ 3,049.03 on June 23, 1967.' The order itself simply appoints the Second National guardian in general terms without expressly limiting its guardianship to the collection and conservation of the life insurance payments. However, when the Orphans' Court order is considered together with the earlier testamentary designation of Mary Menicucci as general guardian of the minor's estate, it is apparent that in appointing the Second National as guardian the purpose of the Orphans' Court was not to supersede the testamentary guardian, but merely to set up another guardianship limited to the life insurance proceeds.
It is clear, therefore, from an examination of the will, the petition for the appointment of the guardian, the Orphans' Court order appointing the guardian, and the pleadings in the case, that Mary Menicucci by virtue of her appointment as guardian by the will was the guardian of all of the minor's estate except the proceeds of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. policy and as such was responsible for, and actually did perform the duties connected with, managing the minor's real estate in question, including collecting the rents for the housing accommodations involved in the present case. It is clear also that Second National's guardianship was limited to the life insurance proceeds referred to above. A specification in the Orphans' Court order of the special purpose and limited scope of Second National's guardianship would undoubtedly have prevented the confusion which resulted in plaintiff's suing the wrong party and which necessitated the present corrective motion to bring in the proper party defendant.
Defendant's contention that the statute of limitations has run and that therefore an additional defendant cannot be joined is without merit with respect to the claim for restitution. It is well settled that the statute of limitations contained in the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, 1881 et seq., under which the present action was brought, does not bar a claim for restitution. Blood v. Fleming, 10 Cir., 1947, 161 F.2d 292; Creedon v. Randolph, 5 Cir., 1948, 165 F.2d 918; Warner Holding Co. v. Creedon, 8 Cir., 1948, 166 F.2d 119.
And Now, March 23, 1953, in accordance with the foregoing opinion, it is Ordered that plaintiff's motion to add as additional defendant Mary Menicucci, Executrix of the Estate of Emma Fava, deceased, and Testamentary Guardian of Gloria E. R. Fava, a minor, be and the same is hereby granted.
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