Arnold D. Wilner, James Craig Kuhn, Jr., of Wilner, Wilner & Kuhn, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
William L. Hammond, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., and Robert E. Woodside, Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Charles C. Hewitt, W. Gordon Rauck, of Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, Pittsburgh, for Stackpole Carbon Co., intervenor-appellee.
Before Rhodes, P. J., and Hirt, Reno, Dithrich, Ross and Gunther, JJ.
[ 172 Pa. Super. Page 425]
The compensation authorities denied benefits to appellant and two other claimants because they were disqualified under the Unemployment Compensation Law, § 401(d), 43 P.S. § 801, which provides: 'Compensation
[ 172 Pa. Super. Page 426]
shall be payable to any employe who is or becomes unemployed, and who -- * * * (d) Is able to work and available for suitable work.'
The Board's findings of fact are: '1. The claimant was last employed by Stackpole Carbon Company, of St. Marys, Pa., and her last day of work was July 27, 1951, when she was laid off due to lack of work. 2. On October 29, 1951, the claimant [while drawing benefits] was recalled by above employer and offered work on the two shifts starting at 7:00 A.M., until 3:00 P.M., and from 4:30 P.M., until 12:30 A.M. The claimant was unable to accept work on either of these shifts for the reasons that she had two children, aged seven and four, to care for. She was available for the shift from 11:00 P.M., until 7:00 A.M., which was the shift she worked on when laid off. 3. There was no normally existing labor market for claimant's services in St. Marys, Pa., on a shift beginning at 11:00 P.M. and ending at 7:00 A.M., the only shift on which claimant was in a position to accept employment.'
Relying upon Mooney Unemployment Compensation Case, 162 Pa. Super. 183, 56 A.2d 386, the Board held that appellant was not disqualified under § 402(a) of the law, since certain domestic circumstances constituted good cause for refusing the employment, and based its denial of compensation upon the ground that 'the resulting restriction on the hours during which she can accept employment necessitates disqualification under Section 401(d). The absence of a normally existing labor market for claimant's services clearly results in unavailability under Section 401(d), [supra].'
Appellant's chief complaint relates to the second finding. She contends that the Board entirely disregarded her uncontradicted testimony to the effect that she was ...