Richardson Dilworth, Dist. Atty., Michael von Moschzisker, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Armand Della Porta, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before Rhodes, P. J., and Hirt, Reno, Dithrich, Ross, Arnold and Gunther, JJ.
[ 171 Pa. Super. Page 286]
Relator and three other individuals, including one Richard Febo, were indicted on February 18, 1948, at Nos. 398 and 399, February Sessions, 1948, in the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Philadelphia County. Each indictment charged the offense of armed robbery. On April 28, 1948, relator and Febo entered guilty pleas to both indictments, and testimony was taken as to the offenses.*fn1 They were held for sentence.
The notes of testimony show this oral pronouncement on the following day: 'Febo and Anthony Scoleri, 20 to 40 years, Eastern Penitentiary.'
On each bill of indictment sentence was endorsed. The sentence on each bill was for a term of not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years in the Eastern State Penitentiary, sentence on bill No. 398 to be computed from March 24, 1948, and sentence on bill No. 399 to begin at the expiration of the sentence on bill No. 398. Both endorsements are signed by the sentencing
[ 171 Pa. Super. Page 287]
judge, Honorable Harry S. McDevitt. The docket entries of the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Philadelphia County to the said numbers and term set forth the imposition of the same sentences as are endorsed on the bills of indictment.
The case is now before us on appeal from the order of Judge Bok of the Court of Common Pleas No. 6 of Philadelphia County denying relator's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Relator contends that the verbal pronouncement of the judge constitutes the sentence imposed, and that as such it is illegal in that it is a 'lumped' sentence and exceeds the allowable maximum punishment prescribed for the offense of armed robbery.
In 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1585, pp. 114, 115, it is stated: 'A sentence, as any other judgment, is construed in its entirety according to the usual canons of construction, and so as to give effect to the intent of the sentencing court. * * * Also, in determining its sufficiency the entire ...