Beginning with Shambe v. Delaware & Hudson R.R. Co., 288 Pa. 240, 135 A. 755, down through Lutz v. Foster & Kester Co., Inc., 367 Pa. 125, 79 A.2d 222, and Law v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 367 Pa. 170, 79 A.2d 252, Pennsylvania has applied definite requirements to determine whether a corporation is 'doing business'. These principles as enunciated on pages 246-247 of 288 Pa., on page 757 of 135 A., of the Shambe case are:
'The essential elements which constitute 'doing business,' as required by our laws, are the same as those necessary under the due-process clause of the federal Constitution. We must ascertain if the following requisite essentials appear in this case: (1) The company must be present in the state; (2) by an agent (citing cases); (3) duly authorized to represent it in the state (citing cases); (4) the business transacted therein must be by or through such agent (citing cases); (5) the business engaged in must be sufficient in quantity and quality (citing cases); (6) there must be a statute making such corporations amenable to suit (citing case). The term 'quality of acts' means those directly furthering, or essential to, corporate objects; they do not include incidental acts. (Citing cases.) By 'quantity of acts' is meant those which are so continuous and sufficient to be termed general or habitual. A single act is not enough. (Citing case.) Each case must depend on its own facts, and must show that the essential requirement of jurisdiction has been complied with.'
It is clear that (1), (2), (3), (4) and (6) are present in this case. Defendant does have a small office in Easton, staffed by its president, a chemist and a part time secretary. All of plaintiff's dealings with defendant were handled by the personnel in this office. The Act of June 8, 1911, as amended,
permits suits against non-registered foreign corporations doing business in Pennsylvania on contracts entered into with such corporations.
The crucial element is (5): whether defendant's business was sufficient in quantity and quality.
Certainly, the development of new products and of new uses for its old products not only furthers but may also be essential to the corporate life and well-being of defendant.
Plaintiff's continual testing of a great variety of chemical compositions over a period of more than one year, and the culmination of these tests in plaintiff's attempting to manufacture the newly developed product for commercial usage is sufficiently continuous, as to plaintiff only, to be termed general and habitual.
Looking at this case in its entirety, I am not convinced that plaintiff's experiments with Plastofil followed by plaintiff's order for Plastofil is by itself enough for defendant to be 'doing business' in Pennsylvania. Nor is the Easton office and its personnel sufficient.
To these two factors must be added the third fact that plaintiff's only contact and all of its business dealings with defendant were transacted in Pennsylvania through defendant's Easton office. Regardless of the many other facts that I have considered but have not related herein, these three factors combined convince me that defendant's agents in Pennsylvania were authorized to represent it in Pennsylvania in its dealings with plaintiff, that all of defendant's business with plaintiff was transacted by or through these agents, and that this business was sufficient in quantity and quality.
Thus, under all the facts of this case, defendant is 'doing business' in Pennsylvania insofar as this plaintiff is concerned.
The remaining question to be determined is whether the Pennsylvania law exercising personal jurisdiction over this foreign corporate defendant violates the due process clause or the interstate commerce clause of the federal constitution, U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., supra.
Since this question has not been raised by the parties and since the Pennsylvania law is much stricter than the federal law, compare Law v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra, with Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., D.C., 98 F.Supp. 375, I deem the relative strictness of the Pennsylvania law sufficient to hold that the Pennsylvania law does not violate either the due process clause or the interstate commerce clause of the federal constitution.
Accordingly, defendant is amenable to service of process since it is 'doing business' in Pennsylvania, and defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint is hereby denied.