them to withdraw the action in the state court, was denied. In effect, plaintiffs sought an injunction by a federal court of a state court injunction. As early as 1793, the Congress of the United States, recognizing the delicacy inherent in the problem of interference by federal courts with the functioning of state courts, by appropriate legislation, placed severe restrictions upon the power of federal courts to interfere with the processes of and proceedings before state courts. The present legislation on that subject is embodied in Section 2283, Title 28 United States Code, which provides as follows: 'A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.'
Counsel for plaintiffs in this action argue that the request for the injunction is not directed to the state court, but is directed against the parties and is therefore without the proscription of Section 2282, and secondly, that the injunction is proper as 'necessary in aid of' the jurisdiction of this court and therefore within the exceptions embodied in Section 2283.
As to the first contention, that the requested injunction would be directed to the parties and not to the court, that is answered by the following language of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his opinion in the case of Oklahoma Packing Company v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 308 U.S. 530, 309 U.S. 4, at pages 8 and 9, 60 S. Ct. 215, at page 217, 84 L. Ed. 537: 'The present suit, therefore, is one for an injunction 'to stay proceedings' previously begun in a state court. The decree below is thus within the plain interdiction of an Act of Congress, and not taken out of it by any of the exceptions which this Court has heretofore engrafted upon a limitation of the power of the federal courts dating almost from the beginning of our history and expressing an important Congressional policy- to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts. * * * (citing cases). That the injunction was a restraint of the parties and was not formally directed against the state court itself is immaterial. Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403, 56 S. Ct. 278, 80 L. Ed. 293.'
Plaintiffs' second contention is that this is one of the exceptions embodied in Section 2283 since this is an injunction 'in aid of' the jurisdiction of this court. This argument is based upon a premise of exclusive jurisdiction in the federal court of the subject matter of the action. The same argument was advanced in the case of H. J. Heinz Co. v. Owens, 9 Cir., 189 F.2d 505, opinion by Judge Hastie of the Third Circuit, sitting by special designation in the Ninth Circuit. That was a case involving patent rights which had been found valid in a state court. Thereafter an action was instituted in a federal court for injunction and declaratory judgment to have those same patent rights declared invalid. The basis of the complaint in the federal court was that the state court was without jurisdiction to make any determination of the patent rights and that its decree constituted an unlawful encroachment on the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the patent laws. That argument was rejected and Judge Hastie in his opinion made it clear that a collateral attack of that nature on the jurisdiction of the state courts would not be entertained. It follows, therefore, that the phrase 'in aid of its jurisdiction' does not permit interference by a federal court even where it is alleged that there is exclusive jurisdiction in the federal court. Judge Hastie's language on that point in the Heinz opinion, 189 F.2d at page 509 is appropriate at this point: 'We find no justification for prejudging the question or for assuming that the tribunal will not respect any controlling limitations upon its power. Cf. Adams V. Decoto, D.C.S.D. Cal. 1947, 21 F.2d 221. But if it should err and a substantial federal question should be involved, there is open a course of review even to our highest court.'
See also the opinion of Kalodner, J., now Circuit Judge, in the case of United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, D.C.E.D. Pa., 65 F.Supp. 420, in which he stated at page 423: 'In any event, this court cannot assume that a state court will act without regard to the applicable law and without due consideration for the rights of the petitioners here. The contrary is true, and is amply demonstrated by the cases: Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., supra ( Cal. Sup., 155 P.2d 16), is exemplary. Moreover, whether the particular proceeding is, in whole or in part, one within the jurisdiction of the state court, and whether that court has power to grant the remedy prayed for, are questions which may be capably determined by that court, and error is a matter of appellate review. The question of jurisdiction, if at all involved, is appropriately one for the decision of the state court and could manifestly be presented and determined in the action there. Kohn v. Central Distributing Co., 1939, 306 U.S. 531, 534, 59 S. Ct. 689, 83 L. Ed. 965.'
Further light on the meaning of the phrase 'in aid of its jurisdiction' can be gathered from the Reviser's note following Section 2283 of Title 28, U.S.C.A.: 'The phrase 'in aid of its jurisdiction' was added to conform to section 1651 of this title and to make clear the recognized power of the Federal courts to stay proceedings in State cases removed to the district courts.'
For the reasons set forth in the foregoing discussion, the court denied the petition for preliminary injunction.
The third point on which the court acted was in accordance with Section 7 of Article IV of the welfare agreement which in effect embodied the provisions of Section 302(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(c), that the parties might provide in their welfare agreement for the appointment of a neutral umpire in case of deadlock between the trustees over the administration of the welfare fund, and one method provided in the Act was by application to the United States District Court of the district. This was considered as part of the general relief asked by the plaintiffs in this case and since the defendants in a separate action, Civil Action No. 12742, (not yet at issue) likewise ask for the appointment of an umpire under the Welfare Agreement, I choose in the interest of expeditious handling of the request to make the appointment under this present action. It was apparent to the court that a deadlock between the trustees of the welfare fund had developed, rendering necessary the appointment of a neutral umpire and the court stated that it would appoint an umpire.
Consequently, a separate order will be filed concurrently with this opinion appointing Dr. George W. Taylor of the University of Pennsylvania, as neutral umpire.
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