of no significance that the plaintiffs are not prepared to manufacture standards, specialties and trailers, or to distribute specialties and trailers, or to do business outside their local territories. They are entitled to be secure against monopoly in their local businesses of distributing standard accessories.
On the question of illegal monopoly in the standard accessory field, it is necessary to determine first, whether National Screen possesses monopoly power. 'The authorities support the view that the material consideration in determining whether a monopoly exists is not that prices are raised and that competition actually is excluded but that power exists to raise prices or to exclude competition when it is desired to do so.' American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811, 66 S. Ct. 1125, 1139, 90 L. Ed. 1575. By virtue of its exclusive contracts with the eight other defendants (or their affiliates), National Screen has the power to remove plaintiffs from competition by refusing to supply them under the sub-license agreements, or by refusing to renew those agreements at their expiration.
Whatever competition exists in the distribution of the standard accessories of the films of the standard accessories of the films of the eight producer-distributor defendants, which constitute substantially the entire market, exists only at the sufferance of National Screen. '* * * (T)he mere existence of monopoly power, though not exercised abusively, is some indication of illegality. A violation of the statute will come to completion if the defendant has nothing more than a purpose or intent to exercise the power, American Tobacco Co. v. United States, (supra); United States v. Griffith, 1948, 334 U.S. 100, 68 S. Ct. 941, 92 L. Ed. 1236, but as the cases show, a 'purpose or intent' is present if the acquisition or retention of the power comes about as a consequence of defendant's conduct or business arrangements. United States v. Griffith, 1948 (supra), 334 U.S. 100, 105-107, 68 S. Ct. 941-945, 92 L. Ed. 1236; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 2 Cir., 1945, 148 F.2d 416.' United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, D.C., 91 F.Supp. 333, 342.
No specific intent to monopolize is necessary; the only relevant intent is the intent to enter into the business arrangements which give rise to the power. By entering into exclusive agreements with the eight producer-distributor defendants (or their affiliates), National Screen has acquired the power to exclude competition and demonstrated its intent to exercise that power. Hence, it would appear that National Screen is in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
It should next be determined whether National Screen has actually exercised its power to exclude competition. There can be 'no more effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel. Only in case we interpret 'exclusion' as limited to maneuvers not honestly industrial, but actuated solely by a desire to prevent competition, can such a course, indefatigably pursued, be deemed not 'exclusionary.' So to limit it would in our judgment emasculate the Act; * * *'. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 2 Cir., 148 F.2d 416, 431. The words of Judge Learned Hand suggest with amazing accuracy some of National Screen's 'exclusionary' activities. The exclusive nature of the original contracts between National Screen and the producer-distributors indicates, indeed, a manoeuvre ACTUATED solely by a desire to prevent competition'. The renewal contracts
which are in terms 'nonexclusive', demonstrate the same motivation. The producer-distributors agree not to produce or distribute advertising materials themselves, and their right to license anyone in addition to National Screen is made dependent on the assumption by such licensee of the obligation to operate as extensively in scope as does National Screen.
Inasmuch as National Screen is the only concern other than the producer-distributors themselves, which has ever operated on such a scale-producing and distributing all three types of advertising materials on a nation-wide basis-potential competition is rendered impossible among existing business concerns. National Screen's sub-licenses to the plaintiffs also demonstrate the exercise of monopoly power to gain a competitive advantage in violation of the anti-trust laws. United States v. Griffith, supra. The agreements limit plaintiffs' operations geographically, in the source of supply they may utilize, and in the customers they may service. National Screen, therefore, not only possesses monopoly power and an intent to exercise that power, but it has in fact exercised the power. And by no stretch of the imagination can it be said that monopoly has been 'thrust' upon National Screen unwittingly, or that it has passively achieved its position of pre-eminence. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 2 Cir., 148 F.2d 416. The story of its growth is the story of active planning deliberately undertaken and leading inevitably to monopoly. It is entirely irrelevant that there may have been no resort to unfair competitive practices. National Screen has monopolized the field of distributing standard accessories in violation of the law.
The defendants argue that each of the producer-distributors could, in the conduct of their businesses, handle the production and distribution of their standard advertising accessories themselves, without the intervention of any middlemen, as indeed they formerly did;
and that, in the lawful exercise of an essential incident of their motion picture copyrights, each could have delegated the function to an exclusive licensee. The fact that they chose a common licensee, they urge, can make no difference, because the products themselves are non-competitive. That is, a poster advertising a particular Columbia picture is of no value in connection with a Paramount picture, or even with a different Columbia film. Thus, an exhibitor of one picture is not in the market for posters advertising any other picture. Therefore, it is contended, combining in one licensee the exclusive right to distribute posters for all pictures cannot reduce competition where none could have existed between separate licensees. United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 33 S. Ct. 253, 57 L. Ed. 481; United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32, 38 S. Ct. 473, 62 L. Ed. 968. This argument is not supported by the facts. In the first place, it cannot be shown that the posters are intrinsically non-competitive.
Except in the type situation which presently prevails in National Screen's arrangements with exhibitors, whereby they are given standard accessory service generally for a flat fee, the products must certainly compete with each other for the exhibitor's advertising dollar. Even if the competitive nature of the posters is held to be a disputed issue of fact, or even if it is assumed that the products are noncompetitive in nature, there are not sufficient bases for a conclusion that the field is incapable of being monopolized. Whether competition between posters exists or not, competition between poster-renters does exist, however restricted in nature. And the acquisition by National Screen of exclusive license agreements for the distribution of standard accessories of the 'big eight' forecloses competition from a substantial market, a course of conduct unreasonable per se. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396, 68 S. Ct. 12, 92 L. Ed. 20.
The plaintiffs, therefore, face the threat of the irreparable injury of exclusion from competition by National Screen's monopoly, and they are entitled to injunctive relief against the monopoly under Section 16 of the Clayton Act.
The charge of conspiracy among all the defendants to create a monopoly is based on the fact of the existence of the exclusive contracts between National Screen and each of the eight producer-distributor defendants or their affiliates. No attempt is made to prove an express agreement. Of course, the law is well settled that 'It is not necessary to find an express agreement in order to find a conspiracy. It is enough that a concert of action is contemplated and that the defendants conformed to the arrangement.' United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 142, 68 S. Ct. 915, 922, 92 L. Ed. 1260; accord, Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-227, 59 S. Ct. 467, 83 L. Ed. 610; Ball v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 3 Cir., 169 F.2d 317, 319. 'Uniform participation by competitors in a particular system of doing business where each is aware of the other's activities, the effect of which is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the statutes before us.' Goldman Theatres v. Loew's, Inc., supra, 150 F.2d at page 745. The existence of the several exclusive license agreements is evidence of a uniform participation by competitors in a particular system of doing business, and the effect of that system is to create a monopoly in National Screen. Without additional evidence, it cannot be said that a conspiracy exists. The essence of conspiracy, in the absence of actual agreement, is scienter by the conspirators: a mutual awareness of each other's activities, a contemplated concert of action. There may be circumstances in which mutual knowledge should be inferred in the absence of specific proof. See Rostow, 'Monopoly under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?' (43 Ill.Law Rev. 745, 781-785). Evidence of such circumstances is not available in these cases at this point of the proceedings. The affidavits submitted by the defendants clearly indicate that each producer-distributor entered into its agreement with National Screen independently, for legitimate business reasons related to its own enterprise; the contracts were entered into over a period of eight years, for varying periods of time, and they contained varying financial provisions which even now appear to be unknown to defendants not privy to a particular contract.
Of course, if mutual awareness were actually present, it could not be explained away by such allegations of the 'normal processes of competition * * *.' United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 183, 65 S. Ct. 254, 259, 89 L. Ed. 160. Perhaps proof of mutual awareness may be possible; nevertheless, from the development of the situation as described, it cannot be presumed. Plaintiffs point to various provisions in the licensing contracts which undoubtedly established that each producer-distributor was aware that the others were also dealing with National Screen; and that much was admitted at the bar of the court during oral argument. Those contract provisions fall short of establishing that each knew the other was dealing with National Screen in such a manner that their combined action would necessarily run afoul of the law. In the answers to the complaints the producer-distributor defendants deny knowledge of each other's contracts. The court has examined the record carefully and nowhere is the element of mutual awareness admitted or established. Consequently, on the issue of conspiracy a disputed question of fact appears, precluding summary judgment.
The nature of the injunctive relief prayed is based upon the assumption of the existence of both monopoly and conspiracy, entailing a decree running against all defendants. Since, on summary judgment, monopoly, and not conspiracy, has been established, a decree can issue against monopoly by National Screen, but not against conspiracy by the producer-distributor defendants. Because of the intimate relationship of the latter of the problem of monopoly, it will be difficult to frame a suitable decree leaving these out of consideration. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree restraining National Screen from monopolizing the business of distributing standard accessories, so that they will be able to engage in that business under fair, competitive conditions. Rather than issue a decree now, the court feels that it would be more advisable to permit the parties to submit proposed terms for a decree and to hear argument on them. Accordingly, it will be so ordered.