M. C. Rainone, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Roland M. Morgan, Harrisburg, Associate Counsel, William L. Hammond, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., Charles J. Margiotti, Atty. Gen., Richard C. Sorlien, John D. M. Hamilton, Philadelphia, Pepper, Bodine, Stokes & Hamilton, Philadelphia, for intervening appellee.
Before Rhodes, P. J., and Hirt, Reno, Ross, Arnold and Gunther, JJ.
[ 168 Pa. Super. Page 643]
Claimant, the appellant here, had been employed by the Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company for ten months prior to his discharge on October 3, 1949. After the termination of that employment he worked
[ 168 Pa. Super. Page 644]
but one for another employer and then filed the present claim for unemployment compensation. The Board properly found him ineligible under the circumstances.
As to the reasons for claimant's severance from his employment with the Sun Company, his base year employer, the Board made the following findings: '3. The Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company issues pink slips to its employees for infractions of company rules, the first two of which serve as warnings, and the third resulting in dismissal. At the time claimant was hired, he was furnished with a book containing the rules and regulations of this company. These pink slips are given only after investigation, discussion, and an opportunity has been afforded to the employee to disprove the violation of the company rule with which he is charged. 4. Claimant received three pink slips for infractions of rules and regulations of the Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company, which he accepted without objection. They were for loafing on the job, and for lateness in reporting for work. The third slip was issued to him for lateness, and as a result he was discharged by this employer on October 3, 1949.'
The testimony, and it is undisputed, is that claimant received his first pink slip in February 1949 charging that he had been loafing on the job. A second pink slip was given him in the Spring of 1949 when in violation of the company rules he had been continually late in reporting for work over a period of two weeks. He received his third slip in October 1949 for infraction of the same rule when for two or three weeks he again had been late in reporting for work. He did not protest the grounds of any of these complaints and he was discharged in accordance with established regulations of the company of which he had notice. The above findings of fact are supported by substantial competent evidence and are binding upon us. Hall v. Unemployment
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Comp. Bd. of Rev., 160 Pa. Super. 65, 49 A.2d 872. The question of a capricious disregard of other competent evidence under the rule of Tronieri Unemployment Compensation Case, 164 Pa. Super. 435, 65 A.2d 426, is not involved.
There was no good reason for claimant's failure to comply with the company rules; his conduct therefore was willful. We have specifically held 'that repeated absences from work without good cause, and particularly in the face of warnings by the employer, constitute willful misconduct connected with the work'. Devlin Unemploy. Compensation Case, 165 Pa. Super. 153, 67 A.2d 639, 640. The principle applies, as well, to habitual tardiness in reporting for work. Accordingly on separation from his employment with the Sun Company on October 3, 1949, claimant was disqualified from ...