Morris J. Winokur, I. Sidney Sherwin, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Richard H. Wagner, Associate Counsel, Harrisburg, William L. Hammond, Sp. Dep. Atty. Gen., T. McKeen Chidsey, Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before Rhodes, P. J., and Hirt, Reno, Dithrich, Ross, Arnold, and Gunther, JJ.
[ 167 Pa. Super. Page 584]
The issue in this unemployment compensation case is whether claimant had good cause for leaving her employment. Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law of December 5, 1936, P.L.(1937) 2897, § 402, as amended by the Act of June 30, 1947, P.L. 1186, § 2, 43 P.S. § 802(b). This part of section 402 was not amended by the Act of May 23, 1949, P.L.
[ 167 Pa. Super. Page 5851738]
, § 11. The bureau, the referee, and the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review denied benefits to claimant, and she has appealed.
The record upon petition was remanded to the Board for further study and consideration, the making of findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entering of such order or orders as might be appropriate; the record was thereupon returned to this Court. In its revised and final decision the Board made eight findings of fact, and affirmed the decision of the referee denying benefits under section 402 (b). The decision of the Board must be affirmed if the findings of fact are consistent with each other, with the Board's conclusions of law and its order, and if there has been no capricious disregard of the competent evidence. In re Lavely Unemployment Compensation Case, 163 Pa. Super. 66, 67, 60 A.2d 352. Moreover, the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are for the Board. Stillman Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 161 Pa. Super. 569, 575, 56 A.2d 380.
The Board found that claimant had been employed as a sewing machine operator by J. G. Brill and Company, Philadelphia, for a period of four years. This employment was terminated about April 2, 1948. Claimant is married and has one child which was about four years old at the time of the first hearing before the Board on February 2, 1949. Her husband was employed during the day and arrived home at seven o'clock in the evening. While employed at Brill's claimant worked on a day shift for two years and placed her child in a nursery during the day. Claimant was referred to Breyer Ice Cream Company, was hired, and reported for work on May 17, 1948. At Breyer's her employment required that she leave home at 3 p. m. and return about midnight. From 3 p. m. until 7 p. m., between the time she was required to leave home and the time her husband
[ 167 Pa. Super. Page 586]
returned from work, claimant had a fourteen-year-old high school girl from the neighborhood to take care of her child. Claimant's home had a telephone which could have been used if required. Claimant reported for work at Breyer's and worked the shift on May 17th but did not return to work the following day or any time thereafter. She called her employer and stated that she was leaving because she did not have anyone to care for her child and because the cold affected her stomach. She made no inquiry as to whether there was any other work in the establishment which might be satisfactory. At the Breyer plant claimant was assigned to work in the manufacture of popsicles. During the first two hours she was seated, during the next four hours she remained in a standing position, and during the final two-hour operation claimant again worked in a sitting position.
The Board further found that the arrangements available for the care of claimant's child and the coordination of her work with her household duties were adequate and did not necessitate leaving her employment at Breyer's; that her work was not unusually difficult or burdensome; that she could have continued in the employment without serious risk of injury to her health, and without any substantial hardship; that her separation was on her own initiative and was due to the fact that she considered the work undesirable and inconvenient as compared with her previous employment; and that she did not act in good faith in leaving her last employment. The Board concluding that ...