cases, so that referees seeking the guidance of presidents frequently find it necessary in their research to go behind the printed reports and resort to the files of the cases. The opinion portion of the decisions is usually brief, and often fails specifically to resolve conflicting contentions of the parties or to explain in detail the process of reasoning by which the result was reached.'
It is evident from the record in this case that the recommendations of Mr. Justice Jackson's Committee are still being ignored by the Adjustment Board. The form of the award in the instant case is precisely the type criticized in the Committee's report, with the same sort of 'cryptic remarks.'
In System Federation No. 59 of Railway Employees Department of American Federation of Labor v. Louisiana & A. Ry. Co., 5 Cir., 1941, 119 F.2d 509, 513, certiorari denied 1941, 314 U.S. 656, 62 S. Ct. 108, 86 L. Ed. 526, the court sustained the dismissal of a complaint to enforce an award of the Adjustment Board, on the ground that it contained neither definite findings of fact nor a definite award, holding, inter alia:
'* * * Further finding that it was unable to determine who upon the list submitted, was entitled to relief, it yet found generally that many of the employees had been furloughed and not re-employed in violation of the rules and were therefore entitled to relief. Its findings of fact therefore, and its award, instead of being and containing the definite determinations of fact, as to the persons entitled to relief, and the relief to which they are entitled, contemplated and required by the act, consisted of merely general statements, that some of the employees were entitled to some relief, and that those so entitled should be awarded such relief as they were entitled to. The act contemplates not merely general conclusions, but precise and definite findings of fact and final and definite awards, capable of enforcement, not vague general outlines which must be filled in by the courts.
'Considering the suit then as purely a statutory suit upon the award, we think it clear that it contains neither definite findings of fact entitled to have the effect of prima facie evidence, nor an award capable of enforcement. * * *' (Emphasis supplied.)
In Railroad Yardmasters of North America, Inc. v. Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co., D.C. ND Ind., 1947, 70 F.Supp. 194, affirmed 7 Cir., 166 F.2d 326, a similar suit to enforce an award and order of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, the court said in 70 F.Supp. at page 916:
'The order incorporates by reference the award itself reads merely, 'Complaint disposed of per findings.' The findings recite, 'We find, as represented by petitioner, that the facts presented in this docket are contrary to the provisions of controlling Rule 7(a) of the Yardmasters' Agreement, and so hold.' This so-called findings is not a finding of facts; it is a conclusion of law. It is a conclusion based on facts that are not in the findings but apparently are in the 'docket,' whatever that may be. True, a statement of claim precedes the findings but whether this statement is identical with the facts 'presented' in the docket is not revealed.
'Furthermore, the statement of claim itself is indefinite. It does not contain the names of the two yardmen over whom the dispute arose. Extraneous evidence would have to be adduced to give the award meaning.
'* * * The provision in the Act that the findings and order shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein requires the findings to be a definite and complete statement of the ultimate facts and not a legal conclusion based upon undisclosed findings.' (Emphasis supplied.)
Mr. Justice Minton, then Circuit Judge, joined in the unanimous affirmance by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the order dismissing the above complaint, Railroad Yardmasters of North America, Inc. v. Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co., which opinion held, inter alia, 166 F.2d 326, at pages 329, 330, and 331:
'This brings us to the issue as to whether the award and order were so vague and indefinite as to preclude enforcement. The order sought to be enforced states: 'The Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company is hereby Ordered to make effective Award No. 318, made by the Fourth Division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board (copy of which is attached and made part hereof), as therein set forth * * *.'
'The award referred to in the order reads: 'Complaint disposed of per findings.' Obviously, neither the order nor the award furnish any information either as to the controversy before the Board, its decision or what the defendant was required to do. Assuming, however, that the 'findings' referred to in the award are incorporated therein, we look to the findings. The only findings which appear material read:
"The Division is here under the necessity of construing Rule 7(a) of agreement between the parties involving yardmaster class as the same be applied to the facts presented in this docket irrespective of any agreement existing with respondent carrier governing wages and working conditions of another craft or crafts.
"We find, as represented by petitioner, that the facts presented in this docket are contrary to the provisions of controlling Rule 7(a) of the Yardmasters' Agreement, and so hold.'
'Again, obviously, there are no facts disclosed in these so-called findings upon which an award could be based. * * *
'The most that can be said regarding this claim is that it reveals there was a controversy between the railroad yardmasters and the carrier as to seniority rights. The controversy arose because 'two yardmen' were, according to the claim, improperly granted seniority rights, and it was requested that the 'two yardmen' be deprived of such rights. The claim does not name the 'two yardmen' whom it was sought to have deprived of their seniority rights; in fact, they were not parties to the proceeding before the Adjustment Board and their names are no place mentioned, either in the claim, findings, award or order.
'We are of the view that it cannot reasonably be held that the award and findings in the instant case are sufficiently definite and certain as to make a prima facie case in favor of the plaintiff. Plaintiff necessarily cannot rely upon the findings and award but must offer additional proof in support of the allegations of its bill. Furthermore, we think the carrier is entitled to know from the order, award and findings what it is required to do. It is argued, and of course it may be true, that the defendant as a matter of fact had knowledge that the order called for the removal of Barker from the seniority roster. If so, it did not acquire such knowledge from the order, award or findings. Surely it was not contemplated that the carrier's knowledge was to be acquired through some other source or means. It also seems reasonable to think that the defendant was entitled to an order which would protect it in the event of compliance. What authority did it have to demote Barker when he was not a party to the proceeding and was not named as the employee to be deprived of his seniority? Neither do we think the defendant was required to run the risk of a law suit (including attorney fees for the petitioner) merely to suffer an order against it which would afford protection upon compliance. It is our view that the award and order are too uncertain and indefinite to furnish the basis for the instant action.' (Emphasis supplied.)
'Cryptic remarks do not constitute prima facie evidence, and before an award will be considered as prima facie evidence in accordance with the terms of the Act, it must contain precise and definite findings of fact and not mere conclusions based on undisclosed findings. To quote at length the pleadings of the parties and then to merely state 'Claim sustained' is but to state a conclusion of law upon no factual determination. In the instant case additional proof would be required not only to identify each of the unnamed ousted employees as well as each of the alleged ousting contract employees but also to determine that in each instance the ousting was because of the offending method and not, as to any employee not specifically named, justifiably for cause. The award and order of the Adjustment Board are not sufficiently clear and definite to be capable of enforcement and for that reason alone the motion to dismiss would have to be granted.
Furthermore, the award states in its findings that 'due notice of hearing' was given to 'the parties to this dispute;' the caption on the docket before the Board reads:
'Parties to Dispute:
'Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employes
'The Pennsylvania Railroad Company'
Section (j) of the Act specifically provides that the 'Adjustment Board shall give due notice of all hearings to the employee or employees and the carrier or carriers involved'. There is nothing in the award to indicate that notice was given by the Board to the employees now performing the work which the plaintiffs seek, and certainly they qualify as 'employees involved' and as such were entitled to notice.
By way of comment with reference to an additional contention of the defendant, this Court has jurisdiction of the case regardless of the lack of diversity of citizenship apparent from the complaint, it being a proceeding brought under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., for the enforcement of an order of the National Railroad Adjustment Board.
Plaintiffs complain that the motion to dismiss lacks particularity and should be refused. This is, of course, completely without merit. The motion follows clearly Form 19 of the Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., and is adequate.
For the reasons set forth in the foregoing opinion it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the complaint be and is hereby dismissed.