will of the vendor; and it interferes then only to protect that good will against injury. It proceeds upon the theory that the sale of identified goods at less than the price fixed by the owner of the mark or brand is an assault upon the good will, and constitutes what the statute denominates 'unfair competition.' * * *
'There is a great body of fact and opinion tending to show that price cutting by retail dealers is not only injurious to the good will and business of the producer and distributor of identified goods, but injurious to the general public as well. * * * '
I find no merit in any of the defendant's many reasons advanced in an effort to prove that the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act is in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
As stated in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., supra, even though this plaintiff parted with the ownership of the six shavers involved in this case, it did not part with the good will that it had at great expense built up around the trade-mark name of those razors, namely, 'Sunbeam' and 'Shavemaster.' This defendant did not advertise merely a razor for sale, he advertised a 'Shavemaster' electric razor. By so doing he has invaded a right that this plaintiff has been given by the Fair Trade Act of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in respect to a sale made under the terms of that Act and that trade-mark must be kept inviolate whether the sale is intrastate or interstate.
It is true the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never passed upon the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act; on the other hand, it has not hesitated to construe and enforce the Act.
In a very well considered opinion in Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., Limited, D.C.D.E. La., 56 F.Supp. 922, 927, Judge Borah stated, 'The history of the legislation leaves no doubt that Congress enacted the Miller-Tydings amendment with full knowledge of the provisions in state fair trade acts making resale price maintenance effective against non-contracting retailers, and that it was the design and intention of Congress to remove every obstacle which would hinder the free enforcement by the states of the provisions of their local fair trade acts in such fashion as their respective legislatures saw fit.'
Congress has spoken and the legislature of Pennsylvania has spoken and there is no doubt in my mind what was the legislative intent in both instances. As to the wisdom of such legislation, we are not here concerned. As indicated above, I find nothing in the legislation violative of either the Constitution of the United States nor that of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
All of the jurisdictional requirements are present here.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the admitted acts of the defendant in cutting the price of plaintiff's trade-marked product are in direct violation of the Fair Trade Act of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; that the actions of the defendant threaten irreparable damage to the plaintiff;
that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law and is entitled to the injunctive process of this Court for its protection. A decree for permanent injunction is being filed contemporaneously with this opinion.
Now, to wit., June 10, 1950, the defendant, S. A. Wentling, is permanently enjoined and restrained from committing further acts of unfair competition in relation to Fair Trade marked products of plaintiff, Sunbeam Corporation, and from violating said plaintiff's fair trade agreements, and the defendant's counterclaim is dismissed.