Original jurisdiction, No. 1628, Miscellaneous Docket, petition for writ of habeas corpus, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. James Spencer v. Stanley P. Ashe, Warden, Western State Penitentiary. Writ refused.
Clair V. Duff, for petitioner.
Owen B. McManus, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, with him William S. Rahauser, District Attorney, for respondent.
Before Maxey, C.j., Drew, Linn, Stern, Stearne and Jones, JJ.
OPINION BY Mr. Justice JONES
The relator alleges that he was denied due process for the reason, inter alia, that, at his trial in the court below, the jury was impaneled in his absence. The able argument of his appointed counsel understandably assumes such to have been the case. The fact is, however, as the record affirmatively shows, the defendant was present in court at the time in question. Thus, the minute book of the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Allegheny County, October Sessions 1948, contains the following pertinent entry: "And now October 21, 1948, defendant present in open court pleads non cul et de hoc. District Attorney similar. Issue joined. EODIE a jury being called and came... [names of jurors],... impaneled and sworn...."
In Commonwealth ex rel. McGlinn v. Smith, 344 Pa. 41, 47, 24 A.2d 1, our present Chief Justice quoted approvingly from Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, as follows, -- "'A judgment cannot be lightly set aside by collateral attack even on habeas corpus. When collaterally attacked, the judgment of a court carries with it a presumption of regularity.'" In the present instance, we have not only a presumption of the regularity of the judgment of conviction but also direct proof that the factual basis of the alleged irregularity did not actually exist. There is nothing in the case to justify a departure from the stated record. Until the contrary affirmatively and competently appears, the relator is bound by the record: see Prine v. Commonwealth, 18 Pa. 103.
The further contention that his conviction was unlawful because he was arrested and searched by a policy officer without a warrant likewise lacks merit. The record facts show that, on the evening of the crime involved, a police officer, a few minutes after he had been told by the victim that he had been robbed and assaulted, went with the victim in the latter's automobile to the place where the crime had been committed and, in that
vicinity, saw the relator walking through a field. The officer overtook him and placed him under arrest. He broke away and pulled a large knife from his pocket; but, when the officer drew his revolver and threatened to shoot, the relator surrendered. The officer then searched him and found on his person a wallet which the victim at once identified as his. It has long been the settled law in this State that a police officer, or even a private citizen, may arrest for felony without a warrant: Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binney 315, 318; Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352, 358-360; Commonwealth v. Grether, 204 Pa. 203, 205, 53 A. 753; Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Superior Court Ct. 484, 491, 45 A.2d 235. As to the search of the thus lawfully apprehended criminal, what was said in Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 100, 103, is presently apposite, -- "It is the right of an officer making an arrest for the commission of a crime to take from the accused any articles which were the fruits or facilities of the crime and which might be used as evidence at the trial of the defendant: [citing text authorities and cases]." Furthermore, the relator's complaints in regard to the arrest and search were matters for defense, reviewable for possible error on appeal and not by way of habeas corpus. Commonwealth ex rel. McGlinn v. Smith, supra, at p. 47, approved the decision in Commonwealth v. Seechrist, 27 Pa. Superior Ct. 423, as holding that, -- "... a writ of habeas corpus cannot be made a substitute for a writ of error, and where a party is in custody by virtue of a final decree or judgment, or process thereon, of a court of competent jurisdiction, no inquiry into the process... is to be had, and no relief administered on habeas corpus [citing cases]."
The relator's contention that it was error to try him on four separate indictments at the same time is equally fallacious. Although represented by competent private ...