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SCHOOL DIST. LANCASTER v. HIEMENZ ET AL. (03/14/50)

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA


March 14, 1950

SCHOOL DIST. OF LANCASTER, PENNSYLVANIA
v.
HIEMENZ ET AL.

COUNSEL

Louis S. May, Owen P. Bricker, F. Lyman Windolph, lancaster, for appellee.

Before Rhodes, P. J., and Hirt, Dithrich, Ross, Arnold and Fine, JJ.

Author: Arnold

[ 166 Pa. Super. Page 456]

ARNOLD, Judge.

The School District of Lancaster entered two municipal claims for school taxes for the years 1930 and 1931*fn1 against H. J. Hiemenz and E. F. Hiemenz. On the petition of Teachers Protective Union, a corporation (which succeeded to the Hiemenz title), the court below struck off said claims and the School District appealed.

The municipal claims were filed against the proper parties or owners according to the various deeds registered with the bureau of deed registration of the city.

The correctness of the description is not controverted except in one particular; that the words 'on which is erected a three story brick dwelling house known as No. 116 N. Prince Street * * *' appear therein. (Italics supplied). Petitioner contends that this is an incorrect description since the deeds in the chain of title recite that the building is No. 118 N. Prince Street.*fn2

The petition averred a conclusion of law that the municipal claims 'are not valid liens * * * by reason of the erroneous description in said municipal claims wherein the premises are described as 116 North Prince

[ 166 Pa. Super. Page 457]

Therefore in a municipal claim for taxes it is not necessary to state the number of the house erected on the property described. Any house number given in the municipal claim is but an additional identification. Any number that appears on the house may be utilized, and if two numbers are on it, either may be selected. It follows that the averment of the petition that the deeds in the chain of title refer to the building as No. 118 North Prince Street does not, of itself, invalidate the claim. There is lacking an averment that the number ' 116 ' was not on the building at the time the claim was filed.

The opinion of the court below states: 'The city directory and the telephone directory list the address of the petitioner as No. 116 North Prince Street [the same number stated in the municipal claim] and there is a side entrance to the premises known as No. 116 North Prince Street.' (Italics supplied). Since the court found that the side entrance is No. 116 North Prince Street, the case was disposed of too summarily. The case ought to be resolved by one inquiry: 'Was No 116 either alone or in addition to No. 118, on the building at the time in question?' If it was, the claim is valid. We will therefore reverse so that testimony may be taken on what seems to be the central issue, i. e., whether No. 116 appeared on the building in question at the time the liens were filed, with the right of either party to make amendments to the pleadings.

The order of the court below is reversed with a procedendo.

RENO, J., absent.


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