J. Webster Jones, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Joseph T. Coghlan, Jr., Joseph V. Somers, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before Rhodes, P. J., and Hirt, Dithrich, Ross, Arnold and Fine, JJ.
[ 166 Pa. Super. Page 473]
These two appeals involve the same question, were argued together, and will be disposed of in one opinion. The common question is whether the interest of John J. Trainer, appellant, under two separate testamentary trusts, may be seized, while in the hands of the trustees, under a writ of attachment execution for a debt due from John J. Trainer to the plaintiff in the writ, and reduced to judgment.
[ 166 Pa. Super. Page 474]
The will of Edward Trainer, inter alia, provided: 'Seventh: Upon the death of my said wife * * * I give, devise and bequeath my said residuary estate * * * unto my trustees, hereinafter named, * * * in trust nevertheless for the following uses and purposes, namely * * * 4. To pay the one-fourth part of the net income * * * to my son John A. Trainer, for and during the term of his natural life, and upon his death, whether before or after my decease, to pay the same unto his children, share and share alike, until such children respectively attain the age of 25 years, and when and as each child attains that age, he or she shall be paid his or her equal share of the one-fourth part of the principal of my said trust estate, and the trust shall cease and determine as to him or her * * *' (Italics supplied).
John A. Trainer, the life tenant, died in February, 1947, at which time his son, John J. Trainer, the appellant, was approximately 50 years of age. Therefore, both conditions having been met, the appellant was entitled to be paid his share of the corpus.
The will further provided: 'Eighth: I hereby direct that all of the parties under this will, for whose benefit a trust is created, and who are not to receive the principal of their shares until they attain a certain age, shall not have the right or power, in law or equity or otherwise, to anticipate the principal of their share prior to the time when I intend they shall receive it, either by * * * assigning * * * or otherwise disposing of such share, and I hereby declare such * * * assignment, * * * or disposition null and void and in no way binding upon my executors and trustees.'
Therefore the share of John J. Trainer, the son of John A. Trainer, was subjected to the conditions quoted above, and he had no power to anticipate or assign his share of the corpus prior to the time when the testator intended he should receive it. It should be noted that
[ 166 Pa. Super. Page 475]
paragraph 'Eighth' contained no provision that John J. Trainer's interest was not liable for his debts, the provision (insofar as the present question is concerned) was a prohibition against anticipation or assignment of appellant's interest until he had reached a ...