person if the property were re-exposed to public sale.
Courts will not upset a judicial sale at auction, upon the ground that a new bidder has appeared who offers more than the knock-down price. This unwillingness results from the effect upon such sales of knowing that a prospective bidder may abstain from bidding at the auction, may bide his time, and may then outbid the price at which the property has been struck down. That possibility would tend to chill bidding at the sale, to dispose of the property by later competition on successive bids. It would defeat the very purpose of an auction, which is to fetch together all those who may be interested to buy and set them against each other with whatever stimulus that may provide, as opposed to other kinds of sale. In re Stanley Engineering Corp., 3 Cir., 164 F.2d 316, certiorari denied Root v. Galman, 332 U.S. 847, 68 S. Ct. 351, 92 L. Ed. 417; Smith et al. v. Save-Rite Drug Stores, 10 Cir., 178 F.2d 507.
No reasonable explanation has been given as to why a petition for review was not filed within the ten day period required by law, or between the time from October 21, 1949 to February 6, 1950.
No judicial sale should be set aside on account of matters which ought to have been attended to by the complaining party prior thereto. Pewabic Mining Co. v. Mason, 145 U.S. 349, 12 S. Ct. 887, 36 L. Ed. 732.
The extent of the power of the bankruptcy court, in denying confirmation or setting aside judicial sales, is not spelled out in the statute. However, the extent of such power is definite. It is established that judicial sales, made upon due notice and in accordance with law, will be confirmed unless (a) there was fraud, interference or mistake in the conduct of the sale; or (b) the price brought at the sale was so grossly inadequate as to shock conscience of court and raise a presumption of fraud, unfairness or mistake. In re Stanley Engineering Corp., supra.
Where a bankruptcy court fails to confirm a judicial sale in the absence of unfairness, fraud or mistake or gross inadequacy of price, such action would be an abuse of the court's legal discretion. In re Stanley Engineering Corp., supra.
I do not find any unfairness, fraud, mistake or gross inadequacy of price, and it is not even so contended.
The petitioner has not shown adequate reason for not filing a petition for review within the statutory ten days or for his delay of more than three months in seeking an extension of time to file such a petition. I would so find if the matter were being considered by the court de novo.
Even if the petition for review had been filed within the ten day period, McGovern has failed to show error in the order of October 21, 1949. It would be unjust and inequitable to the purchaser and detrimental to the administration of the bankrupt estate to now permit the sale to be set aside and re-expose said assets to an additional public sale.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law of Watson B. Adair, Referee in Bankruptcy, are hereby adopted and confirmed by the court. The order of the Referee in Bankruptcy in refusing to extend the time for the filing of the petition for review and dismissing the petition of Charles C. McGovern to set aside the sale and re-expose the assets to public sale is hereby sustained.
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