January 12, 1950
IN RE PHILADELPHIA J-L CORPORATIONS LIQUOR LICENSE. (PHILADELPHIA J-L CORPORATION LIQUOR LICENSE CASE.)
Abraham J. Levinson, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Russell C. Wismer, Special Deputy Attorney General, Horace A. Segelbaum, Deputy Attorney General, T. McKeen Chidsey, Attorney General, for appellee.
Before Rhodes, P. J., and Dithrich, Ross, Arnold and Fine, JJ.
[ 166 Pa. Super. Page 238]
The Liquor Control Board revoked the license of the appellant under § 410 of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Act, 47 P.S. § 744-410. On appeal this was affirmed, although the court below apparently felt that the penalty imposed was too severe. In Re Mami's Liquor License Case, 144 Pa. Super. 285, 19 A.2d 549, and in a number of subsequent cases,*fn1 we held that where the Liquor Control Board imposes a penalty on a licensee, the court of quarter sessions on appeal may not reverse except upon finding a different set of facts. The instant appellant earnestly and ably argues that this holding should be overruled. We are unable to agree with this contention, and we therefore reiterate the rule of those cases.
[ 166 Pa. Super. Page 239]
It may be pointed out that § 410 of the original Pennsylvania Liquor Control Act of 1933, P.L. 15, was amended by the Act of 1935, P.L. 1246, the Act of 1937, P.L. 1762, and the Acts of 1943, P.L. 688 and P.L. 60. The Mami's Liquor License Case was handed down April 16, 1941, and the General Assembly in the two amendments in 1943 did not by legislation change the rule. Therefore there is a presumption that since a court of last resort had construed the language used in the Act of Assembly, the Legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter, intended the same construction to be placed on such language. Statutory Construction Act, 46 P.S. § 552(4). The instant violations of the appellant, and the subsequent revocation by the Liquor Control Board occurred long prior to the amendment of the Liquor Control Act approved May 20, 1949, 47 P.S. §§ 744-403, 744-404, 744-408, 744-410, Purdon's Pennsylvania Legislative Service, page 1610 et seq.
At argument appellant conceded that any question concerning action by a court en banc is immaterial.
HIRT and RENO, JJ., absent.