'Under the present Act the Housing Expediter is authorized to remove the rent controls in any defense-rental area if in his judgment the need no longer exists by reason of new construction or satisfaction of demand in other ways.' Id., 333 U.S.at page 144, 68 S. Ct.at page 424.
Until those controls are removed by the Congress or by the Housing Expediter, they must be respected and obeyed.
The amendments to the Act became effective April 1, 1948. On May 25, 1948, the Office of the Housing Expediter, issued a memorandum known as Housing and Rent Memorandum No. 51,
which provides inter alia that eviction may not be obtained for the purpose of sale, except where the sale is being made in compliance with the provisions of Section 209(a)(3).
The right of an administrative agency to issue interpretations of this character is already established.
Such interpretations are entitled to great weight, Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling, etc., 1946, 326 U.S. 657, at page 676, 66 S. Ct. 413, 90 L. Ed. 383; United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 549, 60 S. Ct. 1059, 84 L. Ed. 1345; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134; 140, 65 S. Ct. 161, 89 L. Ed. 124, and will be held controlling unless in manifest conflict with the statutory terms. United States v. Jackson, 1930, 280 U.S. 183, at page 193, 50 S. Ct. 143, 74 L. Ed. 361; Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, at pages 330, 333, 59 S. Ct. 191, 83 L. Ed. 195
'There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole' this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination." United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, supra, 310 U.S.at page 543, 60 S. Ct.at page 1063.
From the foregoing it is clear that the respondent's conduct is in violation of Section 206(b) of the Act and should be enjoined.
A permanent injunction in compliance herewith will be allowed this date.